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INTRODUCTION
On May 31, 2020, twenty-nine-year-old Steven
Pohorence of the Fort Lauderdale Police Department shoved
a kneeling teenage girl to the ground at a Black Lives Matter
protest. 1 Video of the incident drew public criticism, and the
Broward State’s Attorney Office charged Pohorence with
battery. 2 Pohorence had worked as a Fort Lauderdale officer
since October 2016, during which time he had used force
against ninety-four people, 77% of whom were Black. 3 The
charges followed the revelation of two videos of Pohorence
kneeling on the necks of people he arrested in the eight
months preceding the protest. 4 Before his time at the Fort
Lauderdale Police Department, Pohorence spent almost four
years as a Florida Highway Patrol trooper. 5
Pohorence’s case sparked outrage during the summer of
2020 in an atmosphere of renewed attention to the problems
that plague policing. The uprisings, their media coverage,
and the flurry of popular and academic writing that followed
illuminated contested ground: even those who agree policing
has problems do not agree on what the problems are, and
1. Mario Ariza & Andrew Boryga, Fort Lauderdale Cop Charged with
Battery for Shoving Protestor, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL (July 1, 2020, 3:35 PM),
https://www.sun-sentinel.com/local/broward/fort-lauderdale/fl-ne-officer-shovedprotestor-charged-battery-steven-pohorence-20200630-wqyatvgu6fc4hdtnsvmtl
he7be-story.html.
2. Id.
3. Mario Arzia, Embattled Fort Lauderdale Cop Has History of Force Against
Blacks, S. FLA. SUN SENTINEL (June 13, 2020, 3:35 PM), https://www.sunsentinel.com/news/crime/fl-ne-steven-pohorence-history-force-against-blacks-20
200613-dnujmchcdzd73lfaeuef42ywd4-story.html; David Selig & Christian De La
Rosa, Fort Lauderdale Officer Charged with Battery for Pushing Woman at
Protest, LOCAL 10 (July 1, 2020, 12:44 PM), https://www.local10.com/news/local
/2020/06/30/fort-lauderdale-officer-charged-with-battery-for-pushing-woman-atprotest.
4. Ted Scouten, FDLE Investigating Fort Lauderdale Police Officer Steven
Pohorence’s Previous Uses of Force, CBS MIAMI (June 23, 2020, 11:16 PM),
https://miami.cbslocal.com/2020/06/23/fdle-investigating-fort-lauderdale-policeofficer-steven-pohorence/.
5. Selig & De La Rosa, supra note 3.
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those who agree, at least in part, upon the problems do not
always agree upon the solutions. 6 Traditionally, legal
scholars have focused on constitutional law and section 1983
suits as the primary sites of police conduct regulation. 7
Though more recent scholarship has introduced a wider
range of legal analyses and sources of authority for change
in policing, much of the attention remains on fixing legal
doctrine to produce different outcomes. 8
6. See, e.g., James Downie, Time to Toss the ‘Bad Apples’ Excuse, WASH. POST
(May 31, 2020, 5:09 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/05/31
/time-toss-bad-apples-excuse/; German Lopez, American Policing Is Broken.
Here’s How to Fix It., VOX (Sep. 1, 2017, 10:53 AM), https://www.vox.com/policyand-politics/2016/11/29/12989428/police-shooting-race-crime; Reddit Hudson,
I’m a Black Ex-Cop, and This Is the Real Truth About Race and Policing, VOX
(July 17, 2016, 11:22 AM), https://www.vox.com/2015/5/28/8661977/race-policeofficer; Seth W. Stoughton, Jeffrey J. Noble & Geoffrey P. Alpert, How to Actually
Fix America’s Police, ATLANTIC (June 3, 2020), https://www.theatlantic
.com/ideas/archive/2020/06/how-actually-fix-americas-police/612520/; Todd May
& George Yancy, Policing Is Doing What It Was Meant to Do. That’s the Problem.,
N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/21/opinion/policeviolence-racism-reform.html. For a thorough review on the evolution of policing
scholarship in the legal academy, see generally Amna Akbar, An Abolitionist
Horizon for (Police) Reform, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1781 (2020).
7. See Rachel Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 781–
86 (2012) (describing the scope and method of traditional policing scholarship as
firmly planted in constitutional doctrine and critique of that doctrine).
8. Compare Akbar, supra note 6, at 1787 (advancing an abolitionist approach
to legal scholarship), and Jocelyn Simonson, Police Reform Through a Power
Lens, 130 YALE L.J. 778, 792 (2021) (emphasizing that shifting power to
communities most harmed by policing is integral to police reform), and Rachel
Moran, Police Privacy, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 153, 185 (2019) (putting forth a
balancing test to increase public transparency of police disciplinary records), and
Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 936–37 (2014)
(exposing that police officers are rarely responsible for paying damages in civil
suits), and John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate Public Police, 130
HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1551–55 (2017) (suggesting insurers could play a role in
regulating the police), and Maria Ponomarenko, Rethinking Police Rulemaking,
114 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 45 (2019) (proposing regulatory intermediaries as an
administrative law solution to police governance), with Orin Kerr, The Case for
the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 590–94 (2009) (advocating the
use of police regulations, in addition to constitutional doctrine, to constrain
undercover policing), and Brandon Hasbrouck, Abolishing Racist Policing with
the Thirteenth Amendment, 67 UCLA L. REV. 1108, 1110 (2020) (suggesting a
different constitutional basis for challenging racist policing), and Barry
Friedman, Brandon L. Garrett, Rachel Harmon, Christy E. Lopez, Tracey L.

2022]

DEVELOPING POLICE

275

The nation’s reckoning with policing has produced bills
and legislation on the federal and state levels. 9 Since
summer 2020, state legislatures have enacted laws to abolish
qualified immunity, outlaw chokeholds, and require officers
to intervene when they witness excessive force. 10 Other
Meares, Maria Ponomarenko, Christopher Slobogin & Tom R. Tyler, Changing
the Law to Change Policing: First Steps, JUST. COLLABORATORY (June 2020),
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/justice/document/change_to_c
hange_final.pdf (proposing a mix of traditional constitutional remedies and
regulatory and institutional reforms to change policing).
9. Cities also acted. See Legal Defense Fund, One Year After George Floyd:
The Changing Landscape of Policing, NAACP, https://www.naacpldf.org/georgefloyd-anniversary/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
10. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-131 (2021) (effective July 6, 2021)
(abolishing qualified immunity for cases involving civil rights); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 41-4A-3, 41-4A-4 (2021) (establishing a cause of action for deprivation of civil
rights and prohibiting the defense of qualified immunity in those cases); CAL.
GOV’T CODE § 7286.5 (West 2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2021) (outlawing chokeholds);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-707 (2021) (effective July 6, 2021) (outlawing chokeholds
and prohibiting use of ketamine by peace officers); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 607A
(2021) (criminalizing chokeholds except when necessary to protect life); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/7-5.5 (2021) (effective July 1, 2021) (prohibiting use of chokeholds
except when deadly force is justified); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6E, § 14 (2021)
(effective July 1, 2021) (prohibiting officers from using chokeholds or firing at
fleeing vehicles unless necessary to prevent imminent harm); MINN. STAT.
§ 609.06 (2020) (effective Aug. 1, 2020) (outlawing chokeholds, hogtieing, and
transporting people face down and revising use of force standards); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 193.350 (2021) (effective Aug. 7, 2020) (prohibiting the use of chokeholds);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 121.13-a (McKinney 2021) (effective June 12, 2020)
(criminalizing the use of chokeholds by officers); H.B. 4203, 80th Leg. Assemb.,
1st Spec. Sess. (Or. 2020) (effective Sept. 1, 2020) (amending OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 161.195–161.275 by outlawing the use of chokeholds unless deadly force is
justified); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53-6-105, 53-6-202 (West 2021) (effective June 25,
2020) (prohibiting peace officer basic training to include chokehold as a valid
method of restraint); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 2401 (2021) (effective Sept. 1, 2020)
(amendment effective Oct. 1, 2021) (original amendment outlawed placing
subjects in a prohibited restraint, while recent amendment explicitly outlaws
chokeholds); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-83.4 (2021) (effective Mar. 1, 2021)
(prohibiting officers from using neck restraints, firing into moving vehicles, or
using kinetic munitions); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-282e (2020) (effective Oct. 1, 2020)
(requiring police to intervene when they witness excessive force); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/7-16 (2021) (effective July 1, 2021); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-524
(West 2021) (effective July 1, 2022) (limiting the use of force and requiring officers
to intervene when they witness the use of excessive force); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 193.355 (2020) (effective Aug. 7, 2020) (requiring officers to intervene and
report unjustified uses of force); H.B. 4205, 80th Leg. Assemb., 1st Spec. Sess.
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legislation has aimed to shed light on police misconduct
records, mandate data collection, and require investigation
of police killings and in-custody deaths. 11 At the federal level,
the House of Representatives passed the George Floyd
Justice in Policing Act, first as H.R. 7120 in 2020 and again
as H.R. 1280 in 2021, though it ultimately died in the
Senate. 12 The bill proposed similar changes to those outlined
(Or. 2020) (effective Sept. 1, 2020) (amending OR. REV. STAT. §§ 181A.355,
181A.670, by requiring officers to intervene when they see other officers using
excessive force); VA. CODE. ANN. § 19.2-83.6 (2021) (effective Mar. 1, 2021)
(requiring officers to intervene when they see other officers using excessive force).
11. See, e.g., H.B. 2168, 55th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2021) (effective Dec 1,
2021) (amending ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-1117 (2020) and mandating reporting
of use of force data); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-9-602 (2021) (effective July 28, 2021)
(requiring police separation notices to state if an officer was terminated or
resigned due to excessive force or dishonesty); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12525.3 (2021)
(effective Jan. 1, 2021) (requiring public reporting of state prosecutors’
investigations of police shootings of unarmed civilians); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51277a (2021) (effective May 6, 2021) (requiring prosecutors to investigate police
killings and in-custody deaths and prosecute officers if supported by the
investigation); 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 709/5-11 (2021) (effective July 1, 2021)
(mandating that law enforcement agencies report information to the FBI use of
force database); 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/25 (2021) (effective July 1, 2021) (law
enforcement agencies create and maintain a database of officers disciplined for
misconduct); H.B. 670, Maryland Police Accountability Act, 2021 Leg. Sess. (Md.
2021) (effective July 1, 2022) (making certain disciplinary records available
through Public Information Act requests, repealing the Law Enforcement
Officers’ Bill of Rights, instituting new disciplinary process, and requiring
prosecutors to investigate police killings); S.B. 5496, 2019–2020 Leg. Sess. (N.Y.
2020) (repealing Section 50-a, which prohibited disclosure of law enforcement
disciplinary records); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 75 (McKinney 2021) (effective Apr. 1,
2021) (creating an independent misconduct investigative office); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 2.2-511.1 (2021) (effective Mar. 1, 2021) (allowing the Attorney General to
investigate law enforcement agencies for pattern or practice violations); VA. CODE
ANN. § 9.1-601 (2021) (effective July 1, 2021) (permitting local governments to
create law enforcement civilian oversight boards).
12. Qualified immunity emerged as one of the biggest obstacles to the bill
passing the Senate, and sheriffs’ lobbies took a hard line against reforms. See
Jessica Pishko, The Local Elected Officials Who Are Tanking Police Reform,
SLATE (Oct. 4, 2021, 10:39 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/10
/when-police-reform-stalls-the-sheriffs-are-often-to-blame.html. State bills to
end qualified immunity also mostly failed after pushback from law enforcement.
See Kimberly Kindy, Dozens of States Have Tried to End Qualified Immunity.
Police Officers and Unions Helped Beat Nearly Every Bill, WASH. POST. (Oct. 7,
2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/qualified-immunitypolice-lobbying-state-legislatures/2021/10/06/60e546bc-0cdf-11ec-aea1-42a8138f
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above. 13 It also set up a pilot program to develop recruitment,
hiring, and promotion standards. 14 The federal bill’s
recruitment standards would have provided incentives for
localities to diversify their police forces and encourage
officers to live and work in the same districts. 15 But had it
passed, the legislation would have overlooked another
important hiring qualification that has the potential to affect
policing outcomes: age.
Federal, state, and local laws and police regulations
govern the standards for who should be entrusted with a
badge and a gun. Like many other jobs requiring certification
or licensure, one criterion for police hiring is age. 16 Police
officers in the United States must generally reach a
minimum qualifying age to join law enforcement, and some
132a_story.html; Isaiah Poritz, Breakdown of Police Reform Talks Highlights
Power of Police Union Lobby, OPEN SECRETS (Sept. 23, 2021, 1:06 PM)
https://www.opensecrets.org/news/2021/09/breakdown-police-reform-talks-high
lights-power-police-union-lobby/.
13. See George Floyd Justice in Policing Act, H.R. 1280, 117th Cong. (2021)
(limiting qualified immunity, restricting the use of chokeholds and no-knock
warrants, and creating the National Police Misconduct Registry).
14. Id. at § 114(d)(2).
15. Id.
16. State and federal laws recognize the differences between younger and
older adults by setting minimum age requirements in order to run for office. One
must be twenty-five years old to run for the United States House of
Representatives, thirty years old to run for the United States Senate, and thirtyfive years old to run for President of the United States. Employers for sectors
other than those in public office may also require attainment of a minimum age.
State licensing for private detectives imposes a minimum age requirement of
twenty-five years old in Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and New York. See Zach Herman, The National Occupational
Licensing Database, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Mar. 24, 2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/occupational-licensing-sta
tute-database.aspx. Landscape architects and surveyors must also be a minimum
of twenty-five years old in Minnesota. In Delaware, an individual must be at least
twenty-three years old to be a real estate broker. Id. School bus drivers must be
at least twenty-one years old in some states. Heavy tractor trailer drivers must
also be a minimum of twenty-one years old in the District of Columbia and
Colorado. Id. In some states and localities, firefighters must be at least twentyone years old. HVAC contractors and general contractors must be twenty-one
years old in Georgia. Id.
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states and agencies also set maximum qualifying ages. 17
National Park rangers must be at least twenty-one years old,
as must Secret Service agents. 18 Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) special agents must be at least twentythree years old. 19 State and local agencies tend to set the
minimum qualifying age between eighteen and twenty-two
years old. 20 In Fort Lauderdale, where Pohorence worked, a
person must be at least twenty-one years old to become a
police officer. 21 The Florida Highway Patrol, where
Pohorence spent the four years before he joined the Fort

17. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act protects older workers from
discrimination but does not similarly protect younger workers against
discrimination based on their age. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline,
540 U.S. 581, 584 (2004). As a result, minimum qualifying ages are not subject to
the Act. In addition, the ADEA permits law enforcement agencies, with limited
exceptions, to making hiring and discharge decisions based on a person’s age. 29
U.S.C. § 623(j). Therefore, maximum hiring ages and mandatory retirement ages
for law enforcement officers have been upheld against discrimination lawsuits.
See, e.g., Feldman v. Nassau County, 434 F.3d 177, 185 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding
that Nassau County, New York’s maximum police hiring age did not violate the
ADEA); Minch v. City of Chicago, 363 F.3d 615, 630 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that
police officers subject to a mandatory retirement age of sixty-three failed to state
a claim under the ADEA); Kannady v. City of Kiowa, 590 F.3d 1161, 1175 (10th
Cir. 2010) (affirming summary judgment against officer because the refusal to
hire him because of statutory hiring age limits did not violate the ADEA).
18. Park Ranger Law Enforcement Academy, Program Information, TEMP.
UNIV., https://universitycollege.temple.edu/non-credit-courses-and-certificates
/park-ranger-law-enforcement-academy/prlea-program-information (last visited
Jan. 22, 2022); Qualifications, SECRET SERV., https://careers.secretservice.gov
/special-agent/qualifications (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
19. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Eligibility, FBIJOBS, https://www.fbijobs
.gov/career-paths/special-agents/eligibility#:~:text=To%20be%20eligible%20for
%20the,mandatory%20retirement%20age%20of%2057 (last visited Jan. 22,
2022).
20. See infra Appendices A, B.
21. Non-Certified Police Officer Positions, FORT LAUDERDALE POLICE DEP’T,
https://www.flpd.org/employment/join-the-team/non-certified-police-officerpositions (last visited Jan. 22, 2022). The Fort Lauderdale Police Department
requires new recruits to be at least twenty-one years old. Id. Further, new
recruits are required to have completed at least sixty credit hours toward an
advanced degree, though the credit-hour requirement may be waived for those
with at least two years of experience working for law enforcement or two years of
active-duty service and an honorable discharge from the U.S. military. Id.
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Lauderdale Police, hires troopers as young as nineteen years
old. 22
Though nineteen-year-olds have reached the age of
majority in the United States, their brains have not yet
reached full maturity. They are in a life stage known as
emerging adulthood. 23 A term first coined by psychologist
Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, emerging adulthood was conceived as
a period that is “neither adolescence nor young adulthood but
is theoretically and empirically distinct from both.” 24 While
Arnett’s proposal first marked the rough boundaries of
emerging adulthood at eighteen to twenty-five, more recent
work sometimes includes those up to age twenty-nine in the
category. 25 I choose to use the term emerging adults
throughout this Article to refer to people between eighteen
and twenty-five, since that period is most studied in the
emerging adulthood literature. I use the term regardless of
the term used by the scholars to whom I cite to maintain
clarity about the cohort on which this Article focuses.
I also use the term because it combines psychological and
developmental conditions with legal and social ones, giving a
fuller picture of how emerging adults function. 26 Emerging
adult brains, like those of adolescents, have not reached full
maturity, which limits emerging adults’ capacity to self22. Florida State Highway Patrol, FAQs, FLA. HIGHWAY SAFETY & MOTOR
VEHICLES, https://beatrooper.com/faqs/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).

23. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development
from the Late Teens Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCH. 469, 469 (2000). The
theory of emerging adulthood remains contested but has also burgeoned into its
own field of research. For a general overview of the debates surrounding
emerging adulthood, see generally Moin Syed, Emerging Adulthood:
Developmental Stage, Theory, or Nonsense?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
EMERGING ADULTHOOD 11 (Jeffrey Jensen Arnett ed., 2015).
24. Arnett, supra note 23, at 469.
25. Compare id., with Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Introduction: Emerging
Adulthood Theory and Research: Where We Are and Where We Should Go, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMERGING ADULTHOOD 1, 1 (Jeffrey Jensen Arnett ed.,
2015).
26. Clare Ryan, The Law of Emerging Adults, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1131, 1139
(2020).
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regulate and control their impulses. 27 Further, the brains of
emerging adults behave more like those of teens under
conditions of negative emotional arousal. 28 Their
psychological development also makes them especially
sensitive to the presence of peers, 29 even as they continue to
develop their identity and worldview. 30 During this
developmental period, emerging adults’ environments shape
how they behave and how they develop. 31
If eighteen- to twenty-five-year-olds indeed possess
different capacities than older adults, it makes sense to take
legal cognizance of those differences. The law has
traditionally treated childhood and adulthood as binary
categories, 32 though there are any number of laws that create

27. Aude Henin & Noah Berman, The Promise and Peril of Emerging
Adulthood: Introduction to the Special Issue, 23 COGNITIVE & BEHAV. PRAC. 263,
264 (2016).
28. Elizabeth S. Scott, Richard J. Bonnie & Laurence Steinberg, Young
Adulthood as a Transitional Legal Category: Science, Social Change, and Justice
Policy, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 650 (2016) (“[W]hereas the differences between
adolescents under age eighteen and individuals older than twenty-one were
observed consistently, differences between young adults and the other two age
groups depended on the emotional context. Sometimes young adults behaved like
people in their mid-twenties. But sometimes they behaved like teenagers—a
conclusion that will surely resonate with those who spend time on college
campuses.”).
29. Larisa Riedijk & Zeena Harakeh, Imitating the Risky Decision-Making of
Peers: An Experimental Study Among Emerging Adults, 6 EMERGING ADULTHOOD
255, 260–61 (2018); Graham Bradley & Karen Wildman, Psychosocial Predictors
of Emerging Adults’ Risk and Reckless Behaviors, 31 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE
253, 263 (2002).
30. Arnett, supra note 23, at 469.
31. Patricia M. King & Karen Strohm Kitchener, Cognitive Development in
the Emerging Adult: The Emergence of Complex Cognitive Skills, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF EMERGING ADULTHOOD, 117, 117–18 (Jeffrey Jensen Arnett ed.,
2015); David Wood et al., Emerging Adulthood as a Critical Stage in the Life
Course, in HANDBOOK OF LIFE COURSE DEVELOPMENT 123, 123 (Neal Halfon et al.
eds., 2018) (“[T]he ultimate pathway achieved by the emerging adults during this
stage is determined by the ongoing, dynamic, and reciprocal interactions between
the individual and their environment.”).
32. Ryan, supra note 26, at 1142–45 (contrasting the legal incapacity and
dependence of children with the autonomy and responsibility of adults).
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a distinction between younger adults and older ones. 33
Notwithstanding the traditional child/adult binary, the
concept of a transitional age category is familiar. Since the
introduction of the concept of adolescence in 1904, laws have
adapted to meet our changing cultural consensus about the
capacities of minors by treating younger children differently
than adolescents. 34 Emerging adulthood has also taken root
in law—most notably in the realm of criminal punishment. 35
33. Every state and the District of Columbia requires an individual to be
twenty-one years old to consume, purchase, or possess alcohol. Highlight on
Underage Drinking, NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM,
https://alcoholpolicy.niaaa.nih.gov/underage-drinking (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
Federal law forbids licensed gun dealers to sell handguns to those below twentyone years old. 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1); 27 C.F.R. § 478.99(b). Immigration law also
contains distinctions based on age. Parents can petition for unmarried children
under twenty years old, but children must be at least twenty-one to petition on
behalf of their parents. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i). The Affordable Care Act allows
adult children to stay on their parents’ insurance until they reach twenty-six
years old. See Young Adults and the Affordable Care Act: Protecting Young Adults
and Eliminating Burdens on Families and Businesses, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/adult_child_fact
_sheet (last visited Jan. 22, 2022). Cf. Herman, supra note 16 (describing the
minimum age requirements to hire an individual for various jobs). For a history
of how age distinctions developed, evolved, and affected different groups in the
United States, see generally AGE IN AMERICA: THE COLONIAL ERA TO THE PRESENT
(Corinne T. Field & Nicholas L. Syrett eds., 2015).
34. See Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, G. Stanley Hall’s Adolescence: Brilliance and
Nonsense, 9 HIST. PSYCHOL. 186 (2006) (book review) (locating the concept of
adolescence within the history of psychology); Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent
Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51 HASTING L.J. 1265, 1271–72
(2000) (outlining how law integrated the concept of adolescence). See generally
G. STANLEY HALL, ADOLESCENCE (1904). This is not to say that societal
conceptions of how the law should treat adolescence have progressed
unidirectionally. Decades after juvenile courts were first created, panic about
juvenile crime resulted in transfer laws that led to the prosecution and
sentencing of thousands of teenagers in adult courts. See, e.g., Kristin Henning,
Boys to Men: The Role of Policing in the Socialization of Black Boys, in POLICING
THE BLACK MAN: ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND IMPRISONMENT 57, 59–61 (Angela J.
Davis ed., 2017); NELL BERNSTEIN, BURNING DOWN THE HOUSE: THE END OF
JUVENILE PRISON 72–79 (2014) (recounting how the fear of “super-predators” led
to escalating, retributive criminal legal system policy against children).
35. States have enacted laws that give early parole opportunities to those
convicted as emerging adults, allow emerging adults’ convictions to be sealed or
expunged, and increase the age of juvenile court jurisdiction to include emerging
adults. See Hailey Fuchs, D.C. Passes Bill to Give Young Offenders Chance at
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In this Article, I propose that the conditions and
limitations of emerging adulthood should inform the
qualifications for policing, because the characteristics of
emerging adult officers affect both the police and the policed.
The growing body of evidence about the psychological and
neurobiological changes that take place during emerging
adulthood should inform evidence-based harm reduction
policies in policing. This prescription fills a gap in legal
scholarship, which has neglected police selection as a driver
of harm and missed opportunities to mitigate that harm. In
addition, psychological and neuroscientific studies provide
an as-yet unexplored explanation of the developmental
underpinnings of police violence and police culture.
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I presents the
features of the social environment of policing. Police perform
job duties that require mature psychosocial capacities with
little oversight. That work further exposes police to an
environment they are told is exceedingly dangerous, and due
Reduced Sentences, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020
/12/15/us/politics/dc-crime-youth.html; Recent Reforms, EMERGING ADULT JUST.
PROJECT, https://www.eajustice.org/recent-reforms (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
Scholars have also argued that eighteen-to-twenty-one-year-olds should not be
ineligible for the death penalty because their transient immaturity and
developing brains mean they are not among the worst of the worst. See generally
John H. Blume, Hannah L. Freedman, Lindsey S. Vann & Amelia Courtney
Hritz, Death by Numbers: Why Evolving Standards Compel Extending Roper’s
Categorical Ban Against Executing Juveniles from Eighteen to Twenty-One, 98
TEX. L. REV. 921 (2020). Blume, Freedman, Vann, and Hritz also note that
litigators have raised challenges to the execution of those under twenty-one,
citing a Kentucky case in which a trial court barred the application of the death
penalty to a twenty-one-year-old accused of a capital crime. Id. at 923 n.11 (citing
Commonwealth v. Bredhold, No. 14-CR-161, slip op. at 1 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Aug. 1,
2017)). For further discussions on how age influences criminal punishment and
culpability, see generally Kevin Lapp, Young Adults & Criminal Jurisdiction, 56
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 357 (2019); Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When Does a Juvenile
Become an Adult? Implications for Law and Policy, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 769 (2016);
Jenny E. Carroll, Brain Science and the Theory of Juvenile Mens Rea, 94 N.C. L.
REV. 539 (2016). Outside the realm of criminal law, see generally Wayne R.
Barnes, Arrested Development: Rethinking the Contract Age of Majority for the
Twenty-First Century Adolescent, 76 MD. L. REV. 405 (2017); Keely A. Magyar,
Betwixt and Between but Being Booted Nonetheless: A Developmental Perspective
on Aging Out of Foster Care, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 557 (2006).
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to that danger, their decisions receive deference.
Understanding this social environment lays the groundwork
for understanding the mismatch between emerging adult
officers’ capacities and their work.
Part II describes the harms caused by police selection
and legal scholars’ failure to address the importance of police
hiring criteria. In this Part, I first describe the harms caused
by policing. I then turn to the federal, state, and local laws
and agency rules that govern police hiring and set minimum
hiring ages. I then describe the landscape of minimum
qualifying ages for state law enforcement officers. Finally, I
discuss what little is known about the history of police hiring
ages and the effects of hiring age on policing outcomes.
Part III analyzes how particular aspects of emerging
adult development—continuing worldview formation,
ongoing brain development, vulnerability to stress and
trauma, and the need for disciplinary scaffolding—
contribute to how emerging adult officers police and the
officers they will become for the rest of their careers.
Part IV proposes ways that legislatures and police
administrators can reduce the harms of emerging adult
police in the current legal and social environment.
Ultimately, it would be best if emerging adults were not
police officers, but other steps can be taken in the meantime
to make emerging adult officers less harmful. I then
conclude.
I.

THE SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT OF POLICING

Human social environments are complex and
“encompass the immediate physical surroundings, social
relationships, and cultural milieus within which defined
groups of people function and interact.” 36 During
36. Elizabeth Barnett & Michele Casper, A Definition of “Social
Environment,” 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 465, 465 (2001) (proposing a definition of
social environment and including components such as “built infrastructure;
industrial and occupational structure; labor markets; social and economic
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development, one’s social environment influences the
availability of cognitive skills in particular situations. 37 In
addition, social environments influence emerging adults’
developmental trajectories. 38 Though police do not inhabit a
monolithic environment, some common features of policing’s
social environment play an important role in understanding
emerging adults as officers. 39 The social environment of
policing is characterized by duties that require interpersonal
engagement and discretionary authority. Officers further
expect deference to enactments of their authority premised

processes; wealth; social, human, and health services; power relations;
government; race relations; social inequality; cultural practices; the arts;
religious institutions and practices; and beliefs about place and community”)
37. King & Kitchener, supra note 31, at 117; see also Sabrina Baltrushat,
Alberto Megías-Robles, Antonio Cándido, Antonio Maldonado & Andrés Catena,
Social and Non-Social Brain Areas in Risk Behavior: The Role of Social Context,
465 NEUROSCIENCE 177, 183 (2021) (finding that changes in social context
influenced adolescents’ and emerging adults’ abilities to distinguish between
high- and low-risk scenarios).
38. Wood et al., supra note 31, at 124. (“[T]he ultimate pathway achieved by
the emerging adults during this stage is determined by the ongoing, dynamic,
and reciprocal interactions between the individual and their environment.”); see,
e.g., Daniela Barni, Sara Alfieri, Elena Mara & Rosa Rosnati, Overall and Unique
Similarities Between Parents’ Values and Adolescent or Emerging Adult
Children’s Values, 36 J. ADOLESCENCE 1135, 1136–37 (2013) (asserting that the
wider socio-cultural context influences the transmission of values from parent to
child during adolescence and emerging adulthood); Tara M. Stoppa & Eva S.
Lefkowitz, Longitudinal Changes in Religiosity Among Emerging Adult College
Students, 20 J. RSCH. ON ADOLESCENCE 23, 26 (2010) (remarking that differing
social context in university settings among religious and non-religious emerging
adults tend to lead to increased polarization of identity development); Sachiko A.
Kuwabara, Benjamin W. Van Voorhees, Jackie K. Gollan & G. Caleb Alexander,
A Qualitative Exploration of Depression in Emerging Adulthood: Disorder,
Development, and Social Context, 29 GEN. HOSP. PSYCHIATRY 317, 323 (2007)
(examining the influence of social context on outcomes for emerging adults with
depressive disorders).
39. See generally Wendy Christensen & John P. Crank, Police Work and
Culture in a Nonurban Setting: An Ethnographic Analysis, 4 POLICE Q. 69 (2001);
David N. Falcone, L. Edward Wells & Ralph A. Weisheit, The Small-Town Police
Department, 25 POLICING 371 (2002); Eugene A. Paoline, (Re)taking Stock of
Police Culture, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING 168, 170 (Roger G. Dunham,
Geoffrey P. Alpert & Kyle D. McLean eds., 8th ed. 2021) (describing differences
in police cultures based on department style or geographic context).
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on the danger of the job. 40 This social context gives rise to
concerns about the effects of policing on emerging adult
development and the effects of emerging adulthood on police
behavior. While this Part will focus on the structural aspects
of policing’s social environment, other aspects of policing that
shape emerging adult officers’ development will be discussed
in Part III.
A. Duties
Popular media and political rhetoric imagine cops as
crimefighters: intervening in serious, violent crimes-inprogress, chasing down suspects, engaging in combat, and
using military-style equipment. 41 But that’s not what police
do. Police spend most of their time, even in large, urban
centers, on motorized patrol, dealing with minor
disturbances and traffic violations. 42 That is not to say that
the social environment of policing does not involve a great
deal of interpersonal conflict and tension. It does. Yet the
roles police are called upon to fill in those disputes are more
often those of first responder, mediator, and social worker,
rather than action movie hero. 43 The modern police role calls
more for nuance and complexity than split-second, hardcharging action. 44 Still, the popular image of police plays a

40. See infra Sections I.B, I.D.
41. Barry Friedman, Disaggregating the Policing Function, 169 U. PA. L. REV.
925, 945–46 (2021).
42. Id. at 948–54 (reviewing the literature about police activities).
In Baltimore in 1999, “the most violent, the most addicted and the most
abandoned city in [A]merica,” according to then-Mayor Martin O’Malley,
regular patrol officers spent about eleven percent of their time dealing with
crime. Even that was split about fifty-fifty between serious crime and
things like disorderly conduct, drug possession, drunkenness, and loitering.
In smaller places, the volume of time spent on crime, defined
comprehensively, can be way lower: 0.7 to 2.2% of a cop’s shift.
Id. at 949 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
43. Id. at 954–55, 963–67.
44. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 46 (1975).
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far greater role in police training, equipment, and culture
than the day-to-day activities of the job.
B. Discretion
Once they are out of the academy, police frequently work
alone or in small peer groups and have little moment-tomoment supervision. 45 As a result, they have a great deal of
control over how they do their jobs. On a practical level, this
means street-level officers make most enforcement policy. 46
Police, working alone or in pairs, decide which streets to
patrol, who to stop, frisk, search, and arrest, and who to let
off with a warning. They decide who to speak to with
kindness and respect and who to command and control. They
also decide whether to charge people with misdemeanors or
felonies, under local ordinances or state laws, and if force is
warranted and how much. Each of these decisions allocates
harms and benefits, just as policymakers elsewhere in
government do. 47 It also means if police break rules or laws
as they engage in law enforcement, it is easy for those actions
to go undetected. 48 This discretion is amplified because those
45. See Tracey L. Meares, The Good Cop: Knowing the Difference Between
Lawful or Effective Policing and Rightful Policing—And Why It Matters, 54 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1865, 1869 (2013); John D. McCluskey, William Terrill & Eugene
A. Paoline, III, Peer Group Aggressiveness and the Use of Coercion in Police—
Suspect Encounters, 6 POLICE PRAC. & RSCH. 19, 22 (2005).
46. DAVIS, supra note 44, at 2.
47. Id.; Ponomarenko, Rethinking Police Rulemaking, supra note 8, at 16;
MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL 3
(30th Anniversary ed. Rev. 2010).
48. VICTOR E. KAPPELER, RICHARD D. SLUDER & GEOFFREY P. ALPERT, FORCES
DEVIANCE: UNDERSTANDING THE DARK SIDE OF POLICING, 68–73 (Waveland
Press 2d ed. 1998) (describing the isolation of citizen-police encounters and the
limited contact and control of supervisors with supervisees); DAVIS, supra note
44, at 148 (encouraging greater “checking” of patrol work to “prevent and correct
abuse[s] of discretion”); Ponomarenko, Rethinking Police Rulemaking, supra note
8, at 16–17 (“Although certain enforcement decisions, like citations and arrests,
generate a paper trial, many of the decisions that officers make do not. Unless an
officer reports an encounter or a member of the public lodges a complaint, a
supervisor may have no way of knowing whether an officer approached a person
on the street, conducted a stop or a frisk, told a group of young people to ‘move

OF
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who oversee policing, the courts and administrative bodies,
frequently defer to the decisions police make. 49
Permissive constitutional rules grant police broad
authority to initiate and escalate encounters with people in
the communities they police. 50 The law sanctions “nearseizures,” which are “police-initiated, intended to furnish
grounds for an arrest or at least a stop (either of which is a
seizure, of course), and often experienced as coercive by the
subject of investigation.” 51 For example, the general rule that
police can arrest for any offense gives police the authority to
take someone into custody for something as small as a
seatbelt infraction. 52
along,’ ordered a panhandler off a bus stop, treated someone abrasively, or used
excessive force.”).
49. Barry Friedman & Maria Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1827, 1891 (2015) (“Courts defer to policing decisions in part because they
lack the data or confidence to second-guess them.”); Rachel Moran, In Police We
Trust, 62 VILL. L. REV. 953, 971 (2017) (describing how administrative review of
police misconduct claims displays the same deference to police as review by
courts); see also infra Section I.D. For a history and analysis of the development
of the “judicial presumption of police expertise,” see also generally Anna Lvovsky,
The Judicial Presumption of Police Expertise, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1995 (2017).
50. Alice Ristroph, The Constitution of Police Violence, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1182,
1188–189 (2017); see Josh Bowers, Probable Cause, Constitutional
Reasonableness, and the Unrecognized Point of a “Pointless Indignity,” 66 STAN.
L. REV. 987, 1031–34 (2014) (describing Fourth Amendment rules as “thresholds
to permissive state action”); KAPPELER, SLUDER & ALPERT, supra note 48, at 63
(pointing out that two identical traffic infractions can lead to different outcomes
“depending on the motives of the police and their interpretation and application
of the law”); Friedman, supra note 41, at 937 (noting the low standards for police
interference into civilian life required by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968),
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989), and Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,
532 U.S. 318, 417 (2001)). Moreover, police have a “revenue-generation
imperative” that pushes them to initiate encounters. See Akbar, supra note 6, at
1794; Devon W. Carbado, Predatory Policing, 85 UMKC L. REV. 545, 548–49, 564–
65 (2017).
51. Ristroph, supra note 50, at 1195.
52. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001); see also
Thomas B. Harvey & Janae Stacier, Policing in St. Louis: “I Feel Like A Runaway
Slave Sometimes,” in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF POLICING IN THE UNITED
STATES 39, 46–47 (Tamara Rice Lave & Eric J. Miller eds., 2019) (recounting an
incident in which a mother told her ten-year-old son she would not be coming
home at night because she was in jail due to an unpaid traffic ticket).
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The law empowers police to escalate their assertions of
authority quickly, even if that escalation is premised only on
non-violent non-compliance. Police often feel entitled to
absolute authority, and resistance to that authority is
perceived as provocation. 53 Arrests resulting from affronts to
police authority are sometimes termed “contempt of cop”
arrests. 54
Outside the bounds of constitutional procedure,
substantive criminal laws are also written broadly and with
sufficient ambiguity for police to find pretexts to engage in
encounters when they so choose. 55 “[V]irtually everyone is
susceptible to being stopped at any time.” 56 Nor is there any
inquiry into motive, which makes it hard to challenge
racialized policing practices or second guess officers’ claims
about good faith misinterpretation of the law. 57 The law even
allows police to act in ways that would be criminal if engaged
in by others. 58 This often accrues to the disadvantage of poor

53. Friedman, supra note 41 at 959 (“Police come to expect absolute
compliance, but the commands of the police must be judicious, and the use of force
must match the gravity of the situation.”).
54. Christy E. Lopez, Disorderly (mis)Conduct: The Problem with ‘Contempt
of Cop’ Arrests, AM. CONST. SOC’Y (June 7, 2010), https://www.acslaw.org/issue
_brief/briefs-2007-2011/disorderly-misconduct-the-problem-with-contempt-ofcop-arrests/; see also Josh Bowers, Annoy No Cop, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 154
(2017) (describing the arrest of a mother for a seatbelt infraction in Atwater, 532
U.S. 318 (2001), as a product of the officer’s “personal pique”); DAVIS, supra note
44, at 15 (“Most arrests for disorderly conduct involve an abuse of power by the
arresting officer. . . . [T]he effective law in Chicago often is that verbal defiance
of an officer, without fighting words, is usually punished by an arrest.”).
55. KAPPELER, SLUDER & ALPERT, supra note 48, at 62 (“The law is often
written and can be interpreted in ways that give the police sufficient latitude to
deviate in their pursuit of legitimate goals.”); Ponomarenko, Rethinking Police
Rulemaking, supra note 8, at 25 (arguing that it is not that laws are unclear but
that they criminalize common behaviors that give police so much choice when it
comes to enforcement).
56. Ponomarenko, Rethinking Police Rulemaking, supra note 8, at 26.
57. Ristroph, supra note 50, at 1202; Andrew D. Leipold, Objective Tests and
Subjective Bias: Some Problems of Discriminatory Intent in the Criminal Law, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 559, 562–63 (1998).
58. KAPPELER, SLUDER & ALPERT, supra note 48, at 61–63.
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communities and communities of color, who find themselves
occupied by police yet unprotected from harm. 59
C. Danger
Courts and administrative bodies justify the deference
granted police with platitudes describing policing as an
exceedingly dangerous occupation. Though policing
undeniably has risks, it does not rank among the ten most
deadly occupations in the United States, and it is safer than
it has ever been. 60 Nevertheless, law enforcement academies
play up the danger facing police every time they put on their
uniforms. 61 This sense of danger lurking around every corner
is used to justify police procedures, police authority in setting
59. Ponomarenko, supra note 8, at 12 (noting that discretion results in overand under- enforcement of criminal laws in communities of color); KAPPELER,
SLUDER & ALPERT, supra note 48, at 79–82 (arguing that police deviance tends to
be directed at marginalized and poorer communities); Monica C. Bell, Police
Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2057
(2017). This is not to say that policing is the solution to harm or violence, but
rather that over-policed and disinvested communities have often felt hamstrung
by the solutions offered to address community challenges and have different
beliefs about how their communities’ problems should be resolved. See e.g.,
Monica Bell, Black Security and the Conundrum of Policing, JUST SEC. (July 15,
2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/71418/black-security-and-the-conundrum-ofpolicing/. See generally DERECKA PURNELL, BECOMING ABOLITIONISTS: POLICE,
PROTESTS, AND THE PURSUIT OF FREEDOM (2021); JAMES FORMAN, JR., LOCKING UP
OUR OWN: CRIME & PUNISHMENT IN BLACK AMERICA (2017).
60. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., NATIONAL CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL
INJURIES IN 2020 (Dec. 16, 2021), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cfoi.pdf;
Seth W. Stoughton, How Police Training Contributes to Avoidable Deaths,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 12, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/12/
police-gun-shooting-training-ferguson/383681/; see Victor E. Kappeler, Richard
D. Sluder & Geoffrey P. Alpert, Breeding Deviant Conformity: The Ideology and
Culture of Police, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING 187, 193 (Roger G. Dunham,
Geoffrey P. Alpert & Kyle D. McLean eds., 8th ed. 2021).
61. Stoughton, supra note 60 (recounting training methods, including graphic
videos and ‘expert’ lectures, that emphasize danger to police officers and insist
that they must always be on guard); Caitlin Lynch, You Have a Right to Remain
Violent: Police Academy Curricula and the Facilitation of Police Overreach, 45
SOC. JUST. 75, 81 (2018); Akbar, supra note 6, at 1808 (“Trainings gear police up
‘to treat every individual they interact with as an armed threat and every
situation as a deadly force encounter in the making.’”).
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procedures, and police actions, whether they follow
procedure or not. 62 It also creates an atmosphere in which
police likely over-perceive the danger to their lives, resulting
in “mistakenly but genuinely panicked violence.” 63
D. Deference
The vast power of policing would seem to call for an
effective post-hoc check on discretion. Yet courts tend to
defer to police officers’ decisions, often presuming that police
are acting reasonably and doing their best to act in the
community’s interests. 64 This applies not only to stops and
searches, but also to officers’ use of violence and their
“perceptions of danger and resistance.” 65 Courts also
presume that police are acting based on their expertise,
which courts say they are ill-equipped to second-guess or
evaluate. 66 Therefore, in criminal cases and civil police
62. See Moran, supra note 49, at 964–66 (summarizing Supreme Court cases
explicitly stating that courts could not second guess the authority of police
agencies to decide, among other things: whether people they stopped were
undocumented immigrants; whether police could conduct a so-called
administrative search of a person’s bag prior to their incarceration; and the best
way to interdict people driving while intoxicated).
63. Ristroph, supra note 50, at 1211; see also Stoughton, supra note 60 (“In
percentage terms, officers were assaulted in about 0.09 percent of all interactions,
were injured in some way in 0.02 percent of interactions, and were feloniously
killed in 0.00008 percent of interactions. Adapting officer training to these
statistics doesn’t minimize the very real risks that officers face, but it does help
put those risks in perspective.”).
64. See Robin Magee, The Myth of the Good Cop and the Inadequacy of Fourth
Amendment Remedies for Black Men: Contrasting Presumptions of Innocence and
Guilt, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 151, 160–61 (1994). A community’s interests also often
lack cohesion—even the relevant “community” might be hard to define. See, e.g.,
Monica C. Bell, The Community in Community Justice: Subordination,
Consumption, Resistance, and Transformation, 16 DU BOIS REV. 197, 210 (2019);
Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justice and the Danger of “Community,” 2003 UTAH
L. REV. 343, 348.
65. See Ristroph, supra note 50, at 1210.
66. See Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the
Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 971 (1999) (describing how acceptance
of patrol officers as experts allowed the Supreme Court to construct a raceless
explanation for the officer’s actions in Terry); Moran, supra note 49, at 963–64;
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liability cases, judges are loath to side with civilians over the
police. In turn, judges find police acted “reasonably,” even
when the courts’ opinions convey doubt about the soundness
of the officers’ judgment. 67
It is not only courts that defer to police officers’ decisions,
however. Administrative discipline is most often vested in
internal affairs divisions, who rarely sustain complaints
against officers, decline to discipline many of those against
whom complaints are sustained, and who often reduce
punishments after arbitration. 68 When investigated for
criminal offenses, police are afforded numerous protections
not given to those they investigate. 69 Weak internal and
external checks leave police to operate in an environment of
impunity. 70 Even those police officers who are removed from
Akbar, supra note 6, at 1808. See generally Lvovsky, supra note 49.
67. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 311 (2015) (acknowledging that
“whatever can be said of the wisdom” of the officer’s decision, his actions were not
unreasonable “beyond debate”); Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016)
(finding that defendant officer was “at most negligent,” having made “two goodfaith mistakes”).
68. See Moran, supra note 49, at 971, 979–82.
69. Kate Levine, Police Suspects, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1220–27 (2016)
(Levine describes protections afforded police during criminal interrogations: the
constitutional protections of Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1983),
which protects police from the choice between self-incrimination and losing their
jobs; and those of Law Enforcement Officers’ Bills of Rights (LEOBARs), which
tend to include the following rights: “1. The interrogation must be conducted at a
reasonable hour, preferably when the officer is on duty or during normal waking
hours. 2. Prior to questioning, the officer is to be notified of whoever will be
present for the questioning and the nature of the charges. 3. The officer can be
questioned only by one (sometimes two) person(s) during an interrogation
session. 4. The interrogation must be for a reasonable period. 5. The officer under
interrogation must be allowed to attend to personal physical necessities. 6. The
officer must not be subject to any abusive language. 7. No promise of reward can
be made as an inducement to answering any question. 8. The officer may not be
compelled to submit to a lie detector test, nor may any comment on her refusal
be entered into the notes of the investigation. 9. The officer must not be
threatened with punitive action (other than the threat that not answering
questions may result in such action) or inducements.” Id. at 1224–26. (footnotes
omitted)).
70. See, e.g., id. at 1208 (“Police do not lose their insider knowledge or status
upon becoming criminal suspects. In fact, the knowledge they have and
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their duties for misconduct sometimes regain the authority
to carry a gun and a badge by moving to another
jurisdiction. 71 The special legal rules that apply to police
discipline and subvert police accountability undoubtedly
play a role in the development of emerging adult police. 72
In the next Part, I turn to the laws and regulations that
place emerging adults in this social environment and
consider the problems that those laws and regulations may
exacerbate or mitigate.
II. HIRING FOR HARM REDUCTION
Policing causes harm. 73 Some harms of policing are wellknown and clear: deaths caused by shootings and police
chases; injuries from canine bites, stun guns, or arm bar
takedowns; jobs, homes, and time spent with family lost due
to arrest. Others are less apparent, like the health
consequences of living in heavily policed neighborhoods and
the dignitary and psychological harms of being treated with
suspicion or contempt. 74 And then there are broader, societal
relationships they form as a result of their insider status can appear to make
them virtually above the law because their crimes are both so rarely reported and
so rarely prosecuted even when they are reported.” (footnotes omitted)), Moran,
supra note 49, at 976–78 (collecting sources describing police officer bills of
rights); Benjamin Levin, What’s Wrong With Police Unions?, 120 COLUM. L. REV.
1333, 1342–43 (2020) (discussing collective bargaining agreements that create
weak accountability mechanisms for police).
71. See generally Ben Grunwald & John Rappaport, The Wandering Officer,
129 YALE L.J. 1676 (2020).
72. See infra Section III.D.
73. See Harmon, supra note 7, at 762 (“Police officers are granted immense
authority by the state to impose harm.”); Friedman, supra note 41, at 929
(“[H]arm is innate to policing.”); EGON BITTNER, THE FUNCTIONS OF POLICE IN
MODERN SOCIETY: A REVIEW OF BACKGROUND FACTORS, CURRENT PRACTICES, AND
POSSIBLE ROLE MODELS 39 (1970) (“[T]he police are nothing else than a
mechanism for the distribution of situationally justified force in society.”) As Eric
Miller points out, harms can, but need not be, wrongs or illegalities. See Eric J.
Miller, Challenging Police Discretion, 58 HOW. L.J. 521, 528 (2015).
74. See generally Rory Kramer & Brianna Remster, The Slow Violence of
Contemporary Policing, 5 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 43 (2022); Robert Joseph
Taylor, Reuben Miller, Dawne Mouzon, Verna M. Keith & Linda M. Chatters,
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harms that are not always well-understood. For instance,
proponents of broken windows policing posited that arresting
for so-called “quality of life” crimes helped keep violent crime
at bay, 75 while more recent studies suggest that nonprosecution of non-violent misdemeanors decreases the
likelihood of future criminal complaints and may counsel
against aggressive misdemeanor policing. 76
Everyday Discrimination Among African American Men: The Impact of Criminal
Justice Contact, 8 RACE & JUST. 154 (2018); Dylan B. Jackson et al., Police Stops
Among At-Risk Youth: Repercussions for Mental Health, 65 J. ADOLESCENT
HEALTH 627 (2019); Dylan B. Jackson et al., Police Stops and Sleep Behaviors
Among At-Risk Youth, 6 SLEEP HEALTH 435 (2020); Dylan B. Jackson, Alexander
Testa & Michael G. Vaughn, Low Self-Control and the Adolescent Police Stop:
Intrusiveness, Emotional Response, and Psychological Well-Being, 66 J. CRIM.
JUSTICE, Jan.-Feb. 2020 (Article 101635); Juan Del Toro et al., The Criminogenic
and Psychological Effects of Police Stops on Adolescent Black and Latino Boys,
116 PNAS 8261 (2019), Nikki Jones, “The Regular Routine”: Proactive Policing
and Adolescent Development Among Young, Poor Black Men, 2014 NEW
DIRECTIONS CHILD & ADOLESCENT DEV. 33; Amber J. Landers et al., Police
Contacts and Stress Among African American College Students, 81 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 72 (2011); Susan A. Bandes, Marie Pryor, Erin M. Kerrison &
Phillip Atiba Goff, The Mismeasure of Terry Stops: Assessing the Psychological
and Emotional Harms of Stop and Frisk to Individuals and Communities, 37
BEHAV. SCIS. L. 176 (2019); Naomi F. Sugie & Kristin Turney, Beyond
Incarceration: Criminal Justice Contact and Mental Health, 82 AM. SOCIO. REV.
719 (2017); Thema Bryant-Davis et al., The Trauma Lens of Police Violence
Against Racial and Ethnic Minorities, 73 J. SOC. ISSUES 852 (2017); Abigail A.
Sewell & Kevin Jefferson, Collateral Damage: The Health Effects of Invasive
Police Encounters in New York City, 93 J. URB. HEALTH (SUPP. 1) 42 (2016);
Amanda Geller et al., Aggressive Policing and the Mental Health of Young Urban
Men, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2321 (2014); Bell, Black Security and the
Conundrum of Policing, supra note 59. For vivid, personal depictions of what it
is like to live in heavily policed neighborhoods, see generally Harvey & Staicer,
supra note 52; PURNELL, supra note 59.
75. See William J. Bratton, Policy Review: The New York City Police
Department’s Civil Enforcement of Quality-of-Life Crimes, 3 J.L. & POL’Y 447,
448–49 (1995).
76. Amanda Y. Agan, Jennifer L. Doleac & Anna Harvey, Misdemeanor
Prosecution 3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 28600, 2021),
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w28600/w28600.pdf. Indeed,
in the 1970s policymakers acknowledged that prisons were a stupendous failure
when it came to preventing and remediating crime and recommended that no
new prisons be built and that existing prisons be closed. See DEP’T OF JUST., NAT’L
ADVISORY COMM’N ON CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS & GOALS, CORRECTIONS 358 (1973),
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/10865NCJRS.pdf.
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Traditional legal scholarship has focused on regulating
police harms, and it has judged policing on two metrics:
lawfulness and crime-fighting effectiveness. 77 While the
lawfulness-effectiveness strains of policing scholarship
remain, more recent scholarship has also questioned the
merits of those metrics. Tracey Meares has proposed a
paradigm of “rightful policing” as an alternative metric to
lawfulness or effectiveness. 78 Her theory of rightful policing
requires that policing be both lawful and legitimate, which
she defines in terms of procedural justice. 79 Meares’s
approach elevates the importance of procedural justice,
because laypeople tend to evaluate the rightfulness of
policing based on participation, the fairness of decisionmaking, their treatment by organization leadership, and
their belief that authorities act benevolently toward them. 80
Importantly, rightful policing recognizes that not all harms
of policing can be described as physical injury or financial
loss, and not all harms of policing constitute cognizable
injuries in the courts. 81
While Meares’s paradigm tries to reduce police harm
through procedural justice, Rachel Harmon has advanced an
approach she calls “harm-efficient policing.” 82 Harmon
acknowledges that policing necessarily causes harm, and she
proposes that the harm be balanced against policing’s

77. Meares, supra note 45, at 1865.
78. Id. at 1875.
79. Id. at 1879.
80. Id. at 1875–76.
81. Other scholars who focus on procedural justice and police legitimacy have
argued that legitimacy furthers the ends of the police themselves by making
people more likely to comply with police orders, cooperate with police
investigations, and follow the law. See Tom R. Tyler, Phillip Atiba Goff & Robert
J. MacCoun, The Impact of Psychological Science on Policing in the United States:
Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Effective Law Enforcement, 16 PSYCH. SCI.
PUB. INT. 75, 84–87 (2015) (reviewing the findings of psychological studies on
police legitimacy).
82. Harmon, supra note 7, at 792–94.
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benefits. 83 Harm-efficient policing, then, calls for policies
that “control[] crime, fear, and disorder without imposing
unjustifiable and avoidable costs on individuals and
communities.” 84 Of course, any harm-efficiency analysis is
likely to depend substantially on who conducts the costbenefit analysis and which harms they deem serious enough
to alter policing tactics. Harm-efficiency may also suffer from
a failure to adequately contend with the distribution of
harms across individuals and communities. 85
Abolitionists and other radical critics of the police could
be understood to argue that the police are so inherently
harmful that they can never be harm-efficient. 86 Central to
this point is radical advocates’ and scholars’ contention that
crime control is not, and has never been, the central purpose
of the police. 87 Nevertheless, to account for non-rightful but
lawful policing as part of the harm calculus, especially given
what is now known about the public health effects of policing,
lends a starting point for understanding the excesses of the
current model of policing.
Moving beyond regulating and balancing harm, I
propose a path informed by harm reduction. The
international harm reduction movement grew out of
intravenous drug users’ efforts to interrupt the AIDS
epidemic. 88 Harm reduction applies the concept “do no harm”
83. Id. at 790.
84. Id. at 763.
85. See Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, supra
note 59, at 2115 (2017) (pointing out institutional choices about policing create
“both losers and winners”). See generally Miller, supra note 73.
86. See generally MARIAME KABA, WE DO THIS ’TIL WE FREE OURSELVES, (2021);
Akbar, supra note 6; ZACH NORRIS, WE KEEP US SAFE (2020); ALEX VITALE, THE
END OF POLICING (2017); V. Noah Gimbel & Craig Muhammad, Are Police
Obsolete? Breaking Cycles of Violence Through Abolition Democracy, 40 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1453 (2019).
87. See Akbar, supra note 6, at 1822. See generally Paul Butler, The System
is Working the Way It Is Supposed to: The Limits of Criminal Justice Reform,
2019 FREEDOM CTR. J. 75.
88. See MAIA SZALAVITZ, UNDOING DRUGS: THE UNTOLD STORY
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to drug policy, and then proceeds to ask how to minimize the
damage of substance use. 89 Traditional prohibition policies,
exemplified by the War on Drugs, are at odds with harm
reduction as they aim to stop substance use, rather than
improve people’s lives, regardless of their choice to use
substances. 90
First used to make high-risk behaviors like intravenous
drug use and sex work safer, harm reduction has now been
applied to wide-ranging goals, from reducing capitalist
consumption to improving nutrition. 91 Barry Friedman has
referred to policing scholarship focused on keeping people
safe from government as harm reductionist. 92 He critiques
these strategies because reducing the harms of policing does
not, by itself, ensure we live in a safer society. 93 Nor does less
harm always result in greater equality. 94 Still, incremental
REDUCTION AND THE FUTURE OF ADDICTION 9 (2021). What Szalavitz describes as
the advent of the harm reduction movement was not the first time harm
reduction principles had been used. Nick Crofts, Foreword, in HARM REDUCTION
IN SUBSTANCE USE AND HIGH-RISK BEHAVIOR, at ix, ix–x (Richard Pates & Diane
Riley eds., 2012). Such practices go back decades, or even centuries. Diane Riley,
Richards Pates, Geoffrey Monaghan & Patrick O’Hare, A Brief History of Harm
Reduction, in HARM REDUCTION IN SUBSTANCE USE AND HIGH-RISK BEHAVIOR 5, 7
(Richard Pates & Diane Riley eds., 2012).
89. SZALAVITZ, supra note 88, at 7.
90. VITALE, supra note 86, at 150–52 (outlining policies like needle exchange
and supervised injection as alternatives to prohibitionist strategies); SZALAVITZ
supra note 88, at 51 (contrasting the goal of the War on Drugs with the goals of
harm reduction).
91. VITALE, supra note 86 at 127–28 (summarizing harm reduction policies for
sex work); SZALAVITZ, supra note 86 at 49–51, 150, 158–59.
92. Friedman, supra note 41, at 930.
93. See id. (“Failing to protect certain individuals or neighborhoods is a
problem equal in scope to over-policing, and it is addressed glancingly at best by
harm reduction strategies.”); id. at 944 (“Focusing on strategies to reduce stops,
searches, force, and arrests is not going to address chronic social problems, nor
alleviate the harms of under-policing.”).
94. See, e.g., KRISTIN HENNING, THE RAGE OF INNOCENCE: HOW AMERICA
CRIMINALIZES BLACK YOUTH, at xvi (2021) (describing that despite a decline in
youth arrests and detention, racial disparities in the juvenile legal system have
continued to widen); Brennan Klein et al., The COVID-19 Pandemic Amplified
Long-Standing Racial Disparities in the United States Criminal Justice System
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reductions in harm can make real differences for individuals
on the way to a better world for all, as long as we recognize
each harm-reducing intervention as one of many
experiments. 95 The question, then, is what incremental
changes can be made that further public safety when we go
beyond reducing the immediate harms of policing and
consider what drives them.
In its attempt to regulate and reduce policing harms,
legal scholarship has neglected police selection as a driver of
(Dec.
14,
2021),
https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2021.12.14.
21267199v1.full.pdf
(demonstrating
that
White
people
benefited
disproportionately from the reduction in the prison population during the
COVID-19 pandemic).
95. I borrow the idea of harm reduction “experiments” from abolitionist
thinkers. See INTERRUPTING CRIMINALIZATION INITIATIVE, #DEFUNDPOLICE
#FUNDTHEPEOPLE #DEFENDBLACKLIVES: CONCRETE STEPS TOWARD DIVESTMENT
FROM POLICING & INVESTMENT IN COMMUNITY SAFETY 13 (2020), https://www
.interruptingcriminalization.com/defundpolice-toolkit. We must also be cautious
that our harm reduction interventions are, in fact, harm reductionist rather than
reformist measures that entrench the harms of policing in new packaging,
especially when those interventions require working with law enforcement. See
id. The idea of “reformist reforms” comes from abolitionist organizing. Critical
Resistance, one of the earliest organizations focused on abolition of the Prison
Industrial Complex (PIC) defines a “reformist reform” as one that “expands the
reach of policing”, while an abolitionist change is one that reduces funding, tools,
tactics, technologies or the scale of police or “challenge[s] the notion that police
increase safety.” See CRITICAL RESISTANCE, REFORMIST REFORMS VS. ABOLITIONIST
STEPS IN POLICING, http://criticalresistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/CR
_NoCops_reform_vs_abolition_REV2020.pdf. Applications of harm reduction to
new issues are not without their critics, especially where those so-called
applications of harm reduction don’t “encompass the broader lessons of radical
compassion, antiracism, and elevating the voices of people at risk that the [harm
reduction] movement values.” SZALAVITZ, supra note 86, at 320. For those
engaged in the application of harm reduction to policing, then, it is also important
to attend to whose voices we elevate as we search for solutions. See, e.g.,
Simonson, supra note 8, at 782–83 (describing the demands of the People’s
Coalition for Safety and Freedom, a national grassroots coalition led by formerly
incarcerated people and explaining social movements’ emphasis on shifting
governance and policymaking to directly affected groups); Mari J. Matsuda,
Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 323, 324 (1987) (calling upon scholars to look to those who have
experienced discrimination as having unique insight into law); Bell, Police
Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, supra note 59, at 2054
(theorizing legal estrangement as a way to understand the fractured relationship
between police and communities drawing on community experiences).

298

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

harm. To the extent that legal scholarship has considered
who polices, it has focused instead on ideology,
demographics, and disciplinary histories once on the job. 96 In
failing to critique the minimum standards required of police,
we have missed an important opportunity for harm
reduction. 97 This Article argues that current police minimum
hiring age policies contribute to policing harms and proposes
measures that would reduce the harm emerging adult
officers cause.
A. Police Hiring
Police agencies know it matters who you hire, and
government officials at all levels have at least paid lip service
to the need to hire the right people for the job. Indeed, the
faults of policing have often been laid at the feet of individual
officers. 98 As a result, those responsible for risk management
in police agencies say that “the focus in the hiring process is
increasingly on the ‘thinking’ part of policing. It comes down
to the kinds of people and their exercise of great judgment.” 99
Control over hiring policies, like much of the law of the
police, is diffuse, with governments at all levels and police
administration setting different targets and baselines. The
96. See generally Vida B. Johnson, KKK in the PD: White Supremacist Police
and What to Do About It, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 205 (2019); Grunwald &
Rappaport, supra note 71; Mary D. Fan, Violence and Police Diversity: A Call for
Research, 2015 B.Y.U. L. REV. 875.
97. See Harmon, supra note 7, at 785 (noting that at the time of publication,
there were no legal articles on the implications of law and regulations
establishing hiring criteria).
98. One of the earliest autopsies of the failures of policing was the
Wickersham Commission, which concluded that “the personnel of the police force
at its inception and in its continuance has not the character and qualifications
which its responsible duties require.” Wickersham Report on Police, 2 AM. J.
POLICE SCI. 337, 340 (1931).
99. COLLEEN K. COPPLE & JAMES E. KOPPLE, OFF. CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING
SERVS., RISK MANAGEMENT IN LAW ENFORCEMENT: DISCUSSIONS ON IDENTIFYING
AND MITIGATING RISK FOR OFFICERS, DEPARTMENTS, AND THE PUBLIC 22 (2018)
(statement of Mark Spencer, Inspector General, Prince George County Sheriff’s
Off.).
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federal government plays the smallest role in the regulation
of police hiring, though it can use funding incentives to
encourage states, localities, and departments to engage in
preferred behaviors. 100 The federal government has also
intervened to a limited extent in police hiring through
consent decrees. 101 For example, the Baton Rouge Police
100. Brian Naylor, How Federal Dollars Fund Local Police, NPR (June 9, 2020,
5:10 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/06/09/872387351/how-federal-dollars-fundlocal-police; Rachel A. Harmon, Federal Programs and the Real Costs of Policing,
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 877, 891 (2015) (nothing that while localism is a defining
characteristic of U.S. policing, the federal government funds local law
enforcement with few restrictions, other than requiring agencies to engage in
funded activities); Rachel Harmon, Limited Leverage: Federal Remedies and
Policing Reform, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 33, 54 (2012) (arguing that the
federal government could promote policing reform through federal grants to law
enforcement).
101. See, e.g., Consent Decree ¶¶ 419–35, United States v. Police Dep’t of Balt.
City, No. 1:17-cv-00099-JKB (D. Md. Jan. 12, 2017) (Consent Decree for
Baltimore, Maryland); Consent Decree ¶¶ 281–302, United States v. City of
Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-00180-CDP (E.D. Mo. Apr. 19, 2016) (same for Ferguson,
Missouri); Settlement Agreement ¶¶ 200–21, United States v. City of Cleveland
(N.D. Ohio May 26, 2015) (same for Cleveland, Ohio); Settlement Agreement ¶¶
232–46, United States v. City of Albuquerque, No. 1:14-cv-01025-RB-SMV
(D.N.M. Nov. 14, 2014) (same for Albuquerque, New Mexico); Agreement for the
Sustainable Reform of the Puerto Rico Police Department ¶¶ 14–21, 101–08,
United States v. Puerto Rico, No. 3:12-cv-02039-GAG (D.P.R. July 17, 2013);
Consent Decree Regarding the New Orleans Police Department ¶¶ 234–44, 295–
337, United States v. City of New Orleans, No. 2:12-cv-01924-SM-JCW (E.D. La.
Jan. 11, 2013). Section 14141 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994 authorizes the Department of Justice to intervene when police
agencies are engaged in a “pattern or practice” of constitutional violations by
overseeing reform through consent decrees. See 34 U.S.C. § 12601. Consent
decrees are court-monitored contracts detailing reforms intended to correct
pattern or practice violations. See Allison T. Chappell, Consent Decrees and Police
Reform: A Piece of the Puzzle or a Puzzling Policy, 16 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y
571, 571 (2017); Geoffrey P. Alpert, Kyle McLean & Scott Wolfe, Consent Decrees:
An Approach to Policy Accountability and Reform, 20 POLICE Q. 239, 241–42
(2017). For additional analysis of the achievements and shortcomings of consent
decrees, see generally Allan Y. Jiao, Federal Consent Decrees: A Review of
Policies, Processes, and Outcomes, 22 POLICE PRAC. & RSCH. 793 (2021); Zachary
A. Powell, Michele Bisaccia Meitl & John L. Worrall, Police Consent Decrees and
Section 1983 Civil Rights Litigation, 16 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 575 (2017);
Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 453 (2004); Joshua M. Chanin, Examining the Sustainability of
Pattern or Practice Police Misconduct Reform, 18 POLICE Q. 163 (2015); Rachel A.
Harmon, Evaluating and Improving Structural Reform in Police Departments, 16
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Department was under a consent decree from 1980 to 2019
for discriminating against Black and female recruits in
hiring. 102
State legislatures also set laws regulating police
minimum qualifying standards. 103 In setting hiring policies,
states take a wide variety of approaches, though they share
common features. Typical requirements include a high school
diploma or some college education; health as measured by
either fitness tests, a physical exam by a physician, or both;
moral character; lack of criminal history; lack of
dishonorable discharges from the military; mental health
examinations or personality testing; background checks;
minimum and maximum age requirements; and statements
of compliance with ethical codes. 104 While some of these
requirements
have
been
studied
extensively
by
criminologists who argue they predict future misconduct,
others, such as age requirements, are supported by little
more than intuition. 105 Most police hiring requirements,
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 617 (2017); Michael S. Scott, Which Way to Better
Policing?, 16 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 607 (2017).
102. Terry L. Jones, After 39 Years, Baton Rouge Released from Federal
Consent Decree on Racial, Gender Hiring Disparities, ADVOCATE (June 4, 2019,
3:10 PM), https://www.theadvocate.com/baton_rouge/news/crime_police/article
_d014e42e-8704-11e9-a75e-dbb2d8387744.html. As of May 2019, just before the
department was released from the consent decree, 34.4% of the department’s 636
officers were Black, 63.5% were white, and 2.1% identified as another racial
minority. The department was still 90.9% male and 9.1% female. Id.
103. See infra Appendix B.
104. See statutes cited infra Appendix B.
105. See Lisa Kay Decker & Robert G. Huckabee, Raising the Age and
Education Requirements for Police Officers: Will Too Many Women and Minority
Candidates Be Excluded?, 25 POLICING 789, 798 (2002) (noting that police
minimum hiring ages have been set based on intuition about their effects);
Kimberly A. Lonsway, Tearing Down the Wall: Problems With Consistency,
Validity, and Adverse Impact of Physical Agility Testing in Police Selection, 6
POLICE Q. 237, 238 (2003) (observing that physical agility testing used to screen
out police officer candidates lacks validity); Kimberly D. Simmers, Thomas G.
Bowers & James M. Ruiz, Pre-Employment Psychological Testing of Police
Officers: The MMPI and the IPI as Predictors of Performance, 5 INT’L J. POLICE
SCI. & MGMT. 277, 285 (2003) (noting the widespread adoption of pre-employment
personality testing for officers and finding that the Inwald Personality Inventory
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especially outside of large, urban areas, are set at the state
level, though local law sometimes sets additional standards.
And like any employer, law enforcement agencies may add
their own requirements so long as they do not fall beneath
the standards set by state and local law.
B. Minimum Hiring Ages
Police minimum hiring ages are set by state legislatures,
commissions, and law enforcement agencies themselves.
Where state statutes set the minimum hiring ages, those
statutes are a floor, but some agencies set their own
minimum standards as well. With approximately 18,000
police agencies nationwide, 106 it would be a gargantuan task
to identify the minimum age policies of each one, but state
statutes governing minimum hiring ages for police officers
present a narrow range of age minimums. The plurality of
states (twenty-three) set their minimum hiring age for fulltime officers at twenty-one years old. 107 The next most
frequent minimum police hiring age is eighteen years old,
shows greater correlation with police job performance than the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory); Beth A. Sanders, Using Personality Traits to
Predict Police Officer Performance, 31 POLICING 129, 141 (2008) (arguing that
despite the prevalence of officer personality testing, personality has limited
predictive value with respect to job performance). To the extent that hiring
criteria is studied or validated, we must also be attentive to what outcomes are
deemed successes. Screening out for misconduct is necessary but not sufficient to
change policing outcomes. See id. at 130. For a survey of studies that test the
outcomes of police hiring criteria, see sources cited infra note 128.
106. BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., CENSUS OF
STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 2 (2011),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/library/publications/census-state-and-local-law-enforcementagencies-2008.
107. Those states are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California Connecticut,
Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Dakota, and Utah. See infra Appendix B. Some of these states have slight
variations in the timing of police academy application or exceptions to the
minimum hiring age based on education or other criteria. Where those differences
exist, they are noted in Appendix B. West Virginia also imposes a minimum
hiring age for state police at twenty-one years old but has no corresponding
provision for other law enforcement. See infra Appendix B.
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with twelve states setting their minimum law enforcement
hiring age there. 108 Seven other states do not set a minimum
hiring age at the state level, and one delegates its state-level
minimum to a commission. 109 The remaining four states set
their minimum police hiring age either at nineteen or
twenty. 110 It is perhaps unsurprising that the majority of
state policies cluster around ages that coincide with ages
that mark other milestones—eighteen being the age of
majority, and twenty-one being the age at which one can
consume alcohol. We know almost nothing about why the
state legislatures selected particular minimum ages, with
sparse available legislative history.
Among the fifty largest law enforcement agencies in the
United States, the range of police hiring ages remains
narrow, though it is slightly more concentrated at the higher
end of the range. Thirty-three of the fifty largest agencies set
their minimum hiring age at twenty-one years old. 111
Twenty-six agencies’ minimum qualifying age is set at or
below the minimum required by state law, one is the same
as that set by local law, and twenty-three set an age higher
than that required by state or local law, suggesting that the
age is set by internal agency policy. 112 While agency websites
often do not say why the agencies choose only to accept older
applicants, one might infer that larger agencies are able to
be more selective due to larger applicant pools or have a need
108. Those states are Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, Montana, New Mexico,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
See infra Appendix B. Some states have exceptions to this generally applicable
minimum hiring age. Those exceptions are noted in Appendix B.
109. Colorado, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, and Washington set no minimum hiring age. North Carolina
delegates its minimum hiring age decisions to a commission. See infra Appendix
B.
110. Alabama and Florida set their minimum hiring age at nineteen; Illinois
and New York set their minimum hiring age at twenty. See infra Appendix B.
111. See infra Appendix A.
112. See infra Appendix A (listing the minimum hiring ages for the fifty largest
law enforcement agencies in the United States).
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to systematize hiring due to the higher number of
applications in urban centers. 113
City population cannot fully explain hiring age policies,
however. Though only two of the largest fifty departments
allow officers to join their ranks at eighteen years old, those
departments—the Detroit Police Department and the
Newark Police Department—are located in cities within the
fifteen most populated metropolitan statistical areas in the
country. 114 One is left to speculate about the reasons for any
given minimum age, since local legislatures generally do not
leave legislative history materials to parse, nor do law
enforcement agencies generally make public the reasons for
their internal regulations.
C. The History of Minimum Qualifying Age
There is little scholarship studying historical patterns of
police recruitment, and there is relatively little focus on
demographics in current recruiting practices outside the
areas of race and gender. 115 Bureau of Justice Statistics
reports about the composition of police agencies focus on race
and gender to the exclusion of age. 116 Studies of police
113. Though state law minimum hiring ages are more likely to be used in
smaller police departments, it is useful to understand the policies of the fifty
largest departments because they have outsized effects on national policy and
police a large proportion of the U.S. population. These agencies, which tend to be
located in urban centers, represent a range of types of law enforcement
agencies—some are city police, some are county police, and others are sheriff’s
departments. The fifty largest agencies are located in twenty-seven states and
the District of Columbia. See infra Appendix A.
114. See infra Appendix A.
115. See Eugene J. Watts, St. Louis Police Recruits in the Twentieth Century,
19 CRIMINOLOGY 77, 91 (1981) (statement of historian Samuel Walker) (“[W]e lack
even the most rudimentary knowledge of the historical patterns of police
recruitment.”).
116. See generally REAVES, supra note 106; BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING
ACADEMIES, 2013 (2016), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/slleta13.pdf; EMILY
D. BUEHLER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT TRAINING ACADEMIES, 2018 – STATISTICAL TABLES, BUREAU OF
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recruitment that do address hiring age demonstrate that
police departments have experimented with police hiring age
over time, with state law serving as a floor in larger
departments. 117 One study of the St. Louis Police
Department shows that between 1869 and 1960, the
department’s minimum hiring age fluctuated between
twenty-one and twenty-four, with maximum hiring ages
fluctuating between thirty and thirty-eight. 118 Changes to
the minimum hiring age naturally influenced the age of new
recruits, with the average age of new recruits at the time of
appointment dropping from 29.2 in the period from 1899 to
1904 to 23.2 in the period from 1965 to 1969. 119
Another study examined the ages of Indianapolis Police
Department recruits hired from 1992 to 1997, finding that
the mean age of successful candidates was 27.14 years old,
though 27.9% of recruits were twenty-one to twenty-four
JUSTICE STATISTICS (2021), https://bjs.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh236/files/media
/document/slleta18st.pdf; Shelley S. Hyland & Elizabeth Davis, Local Police
Departments, 2016: Personnel, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. (Oct. 2019),
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd16p.pdf.
117. As in other academic fields, big city policing tends to set the conversation
despite being outside the norm. While a substantial portion of the population
resides in large urban centers, the majority of police departments are quite small.
Studies also tend to focus on larger departments rather than smaller or more
rural ones due to a variety of factors including proximity of researchers,
necessary sample sizes, and prominence. See, e.g., Kim Michelle Lersch & Tom
Mieczkowski, Who Are the Problem-Prone Officers? An Analysis of Citizen
Complaints, 15 AM. J. POLICE, no. 3, 1996, at 23, 38 (noting that studies of a large
agency may not be generalizable to smaller, more rural departments); William
Terrill, Fredrik H. Leinfelt & Dae-Hoon Kwak, Examining Police Use of Force: A
Smaller Agency Perspective, 31 POLICING 57, 58 (2008) (identifying a lack of focus
on smaller police departments in policing literature); Eugene A. Paoline III &
William Terrill, Police Education, Experience, and the Use of Force, 34 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 179, 193 (2007) (suggesting research in rural departments might
yield different results than those found in medium-sized agencies).
118. See Watts, supra note 115, at 83–84 (noting the first age standards, of
twenty-one to thirty-eight years old, were established in 1869).
119. Id. at 84. One reason Watts was able to gather in-depth data about the
age of St. Louis Police Department recruits is because the Department
maintained an oath book starting in 1861 in which “every recruit had to sign and
record his age, residence and length of residence in the city, place of birth, and
occupation . . . .” Id. at 79.
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years old. 120 At the time, the Indianapolis Police
Department’s minimum hiring age was twenty-one years old,
but the Department was considering raising it to twenty-five
years old. 121 According to the authors of the same study,
administrators of the Los Angeles Police Department were,
at the time, also considering raising the minimum age for
new recruits, and the Chicago Police Department had raised
the age from twenty-one to twenty-three in 1997. 122 It seems
that even where minimum hiring standards do not change,
police administrators sometimes seek older candidates. In
1998, the Madison, Wisconsin, Police Department
emphasized that it preferred older recruits, though the
minimum hiring age set by the State of Wisconsin was only
eighteen years old. 123
Studies of police hiring practices observe that age-setting
is typically based on intuition rather than evidence. 124
During the early- to mid-twentieth century, intuitions about
the need for strength and stamina resulted in lower hiring
ages. 125 By contrast, in the 1990s and early 2000s, some
police departments considered raising age requirements

120. See Decker & Huckabee, supra note 105, at 798.
121. See id. At the time, the study also examined the effects of a four-year
college degree on hiring, as the Indianapolis Police Department was considering
adjusting its minimum educational qualifications as well. See id. The study
concluded that the age requirement would have had less drastic effects on the
ability to recruit officers. See id. at 799–800.
122. Id. at 794–95.
123. See id. at 795 (statement of Madison, Wisconsin, Police Department, 1998)
(“[T]hose who are successful in our hiring process usually have educational and/or
life experiences possessed by more mature individuals. New training classes
commonly include a number of individuals who are changing careers. Classes
typically average 27–28 years of age.”).
124. See id. at 789.
125. See Watts, supra note 115, at 83–84 (statement of Bruce Smith)
(“[I]nsistence upon youth in recruiting policemen is found wherever effective
departments are maintained. This is especially true of London, New York,
Boston, and Detroit.”). See generally DUFF G. GILLESPIE & DAVID J. PITTMAN, MEN
IN BLUE: A STUDY OF RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION PROCEDURES FOR POLICEMEN IN
SAINT LOUIS (1964).
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based on the intuition that more mature officers with more
life experience would make better police. 126 Given that
current minimum hiring ages have been adopted based on
traditional threshold ages, intuition, or without much
justification at all, what does social science tell us about the
effects of hiring emerging adults as police officers?
D. The Effects of Age on Policing
Like most policing policies, the policies setting minimum
qualifying ages for police have not relied on social science to
gain insight into the optimal threshold age for police. 127
Though the effects of hiring criteria like educational
attainment and the absence of a criminal record have
received a good deal of attention from criminologists, fewer
studies have focused on the effects of officer age on policing
outcomes. 128 Moreover, studies that examine the effects of
126. Decker & Huckabee, supra note 105, at 794–95.
127. See Lawrence W. Sherman, The Rise of Evidence-Based Policing:
Targeting, Testing, and Tracking, 42 CRIME & JUST. 377, 384 (2013)
(acknowledging that despite the high cost of policing and the increase in evidencebased policing, most police policies remain unstudied).
128. For studies indicating that officers with two or four-year degrees are less
likely to use force, kill in police shootings, receive civilian complaints for
misconduct, or engage in career-ending misconduct, see, for example, Michael G.
Breci, Higher Education for Law Enforcement: The Minnesota Model, FBI L.
ENF’T BULL., Jan. 1994, at 3; John T. Krimmel, The Performance of CollegeEducated Police: A Study of Self-Rated Police Performance Measures, 15 AM. J.
POLICE, no. 1, 1996, at 85, 86; Mitchell Tyre & Susan Braunstein, Higher
Education and Ethical Policing, FBI L. ENF’T BULL., June 1992, at 10; Jason
Rydberg & William Terrill, The Effect of Higher Education on Police Behavior, 13
POLICE Q. 92, 110 (2010) (finding that education has no effect on likelihood of
arrest or search but that college-educated officers were significantly less likely to
use force than non-college-educated officers); Christopher Chapman, Use of Force
in Minority Communities is Related to Police Education, Age, Experience, and
Ethnicity, 13 POLICE PRAC. & RSCH. 421, 429 (2012) (finding that officer education
correlated with lower levels but not lower frequencies of force). For studies
cautioning against increased educational attainment requirements because of
negligible differences in outcomes, or because college-educated officers become
dissatisfied with their jobs and leave the force, see, for example, Alan T. Vodicka,
Educational Requirements for Police Recruits, 42 L. & ORD. 91, 93 (1994); Robert
E. Worden, A Badge and a Baccalaureate: Policies, Hypotheses, and Further
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police officers’ characteristics on policing tend to be
concerned with a narrow range of behaviors: the use of force,
graduating the academy, receiving complaints, and
termination. While those outcomes are important, it means
we have little insight into other policing behaviors, like
issuing summons or making arrests for low-level infractions,
dispute resolution and problem-solving outcomes, or general
treatment of community members.
One complicating feature of studies examining police
officer age is that they do not always disentangle the effects
of age and experience. 129 Studies sometimes assume that
Evidence, 7 JUST. Q. 565, 588 (1990); M.L. Dantzker, An Issue for Policing—
Educational Level and Job Satisfaction: A Research Note, 12 AM. J. POLICE, no. 2,
1992, at 101, 113. For studies that argue in favor of disqualifying police
applicants based on criminal convictions and refusing to permit exemptions from
disqualification based on misconduct outcomes, see, for example, Robert J. Kane
& Michael D. White, Bad Cops: A Study of Career-Ending Misconduct Among
New York City Police Officers, 8 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 737, 751 (2009). It is
worth considering that although the term “career-ending misconduct” is an
objective metric (you can tell if an officer was fired from her job), it is also a very
high threshold, in that many officers have extensive and serious disciplinary
histories but remain on the job. See, e.g., Rachel Moran, Ending the Internal
Affairs Farce, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 837, 837–40 (2016); Jill McCorkel, Police Officers
Accused of Brutal Violence Often Have a History of Complaints by Citizens,
CONVERSATION (May 31, 2020, 4:01 PM), https://theconversation.com/policeofficers-accused-of-brutal-violence-often-have-a-history-of-complaints-bycitizens-139709; Kane & White, supra, at 761 (discussing the difficulties involved
in proving police abuse). The term career-ending misconduct also fails to capture
that officers whose jobs end through firing in one jurisdiction often do not truly
suffer the end of a career. Instead, they are rehired in other departments. See
Timothy Williams, Cast-Out Police Officers Are Often Hired in Other Cities, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/us/whereabouts-ofcast-out-police-officers-other-cities-often-hire-them.html. One meta-analysis of
correlates of use-of-force decisions looked at forty-four analyses from nineteen
articles between 1995–2013, including articles studying officer characteristics
and the use of force. Those articles studied officer education, experience, race,
and sex, but did not include age. See P. Colin Bolger, Just Following Orders: A
Meta-Analysis of the Correlates of American Police Officer Use of Force Decisions,
40 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 466, 467, 470–71 (2015).
129. See, e.g., James P. McElvain & Augustine J. Kposowa, Police Officer
Characteristics and the Likelihood of Using Deadly Force, 35 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 505, 510 (2008) (examining age but not experience); Paoline & Terrill,
supra note 117, at 179, 183 (considering education and experience but not age);
Nicolien Kop & Martin C. Euwema, Occupational Stress and the Use of Force by
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because it is common for police to enter the profession at a
young age, older officers are necessarily more experienced. 130
For that reason, it can be difficult to differentiate the effects
of age and experience, though a 2012 study by Christopher
Chapman combines both metrics, making the interaction
between age and experience clearer. 131
Force decisions are, with good reason, some of the moststudied policing events. Studies of the relationship between
police use of force and age have had mixed results. Some
studies demonstrate that younger officers use more force,
while older officers use less, 132 while others demonstrate no
significant effect of age on police use of force decisions. 133
A study of police shootings by James McElvain and
Augustine Kposowa demonstrates some of the challenges
involved in measuring the effects of age on officers’ use of
Dutch Police Officers, 28 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 631, 643 (2001) (excluding age in
favor of work experience because of concerns about multicollinearity); Lawrence
W. Sherman, Causes of Police Behavior: The Current State of the Quantitative
Research, 17 J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQ. 69, 71 (1980) (“[I]t is difficult to . . .
separate[] biological age from length of service in policing, since most police
departments only hire officers between the ages of twenty-one and thirty.”).
130. See McElvain & Kposowa, supra note 129, at 510 (“It can reasonably be
interpreted that the higher the age, the greater the experience, because it is quite
common for officers to enter into the police profession when they are younger. As
officers grow older, they also become more experienced.”).
131. See generally Chapman, supra note 128.
132. See, e.g., McElvain & Kposowa, supra note 129, at 514 (finding older
officers engaged in shootings less often than younger officers); MICHAEL G.
AAMODT, RESEARCH IN LAW ENFORCEMENT SELECTION 179–180 (2004) (explaining
that a meta-analysis of use of force studies showed that older and more
experienced officers used force less often than younger and less experienced
officers); Diana S. Peterson, The Relationship Between Educational Attainment
and Police Performance 14 (Aug. 2001) (Ph.D. dissertation, Illinois State
University), UMI Number: 3064486 (finding that younger officers used more
force to make arrests than older officers).
133. See, e.g., Charles Crawford & Ronald Burns, Predictors of the Police Use
of Force: The Application of a Continuum Perspective in Phoenix, 1 POLICE Q.,
Dec. 1, 1998, at 41, 55 (finding officer age was not a good predictor of use of force
decisions); Geoffrey P. Alpert, Police Use of Deadly Force: The Miami Experience,
in CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICING: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 480, 480–97 (Roger G.
Dunham & Geoffrey P. Alpert eds., 1989) (finding age had no influence on the
decision to use force during an arrest or to use deadly force).
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force. 134 The study analyzed 186 officer shooting files
involving over 300 officers from the Riverside County
(California) Sheriff’s Department from 1990 to 2004. 135 They
found that older officers were “considerably less likely to
engage in shootings than younger officers.” 136 Despite the
strongly stated conclusion, the study found that the average
age of officers involved in a shooting—approximately thirtyfour years old—was both older than might be expected and
only two years younger than the average age of officers in the
control group. 137 This might be explained by the Riverside
Sheriff’s Department’s practice of assigning new officers to
work unarmed in correctional facilities for the first two to
three years of their careers. 138 Moreover, it is not clear what
the median age of officers involved in a shooting was, nor did
the study provide the frequency of ages below thirty-four
included in the sample group. Given that police shootings are
relatively infrequent, the low n of the study may have
distorted the effect of age. 139 Finally, the long-term effects of
officer age remain unexamined by the study, because it
focused only on the officer’s age at the time of the shooting,
rather than the age at first employment in a law enforcement
job. 140
Studies show that age may affect other policing decisions
as well. A study by Robert Dunham and Geoffrey Alpert

134. See generally McElvain & Kposowa, supra note 129.
135. Id. at 511.
136. Id. at 514. The study also noted that college-educated officers were much
less likely to shoot than those without college education.
137. Id. at 518. It is worth considering that with a minimum hiring age of
twenty-one years old in California at the time the article was written—and with
two to three years of correctional work—the effective minimum hiring age for
armed officers is twenty-three to twenty-four years old. This may mitigate the
risks of developmentally immature decision-making by officers, as I argue infra
Part III.
138. McElvain & Kposowa, supra note 129, at 514.
139. Id. at 506.
140. Id. at 511.
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found that officer age had the strongest predictive effect of
six studied variables on outcomes in police vehicle
pursuits. 141 The study showed that pursuits by officers under
forty were more likely to result in accidents, with officers in
their twenties most likely to engage in pursuits that ended
in injury. 142 Officers in their twenties were more likely than
officers in their thirties, and officers in their thirties more
likely than those in their forties, to end a vehicle pursuit with
a negative outcome. 143 Older officers’ increased caution
resulted in the same number of apprehensions as younger
officers’ more dangerous actions. 144 By contrast, a study of
foot pursuits in the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
did not find deputy age to be a statistically significant
variable when it came to the likelihood of suspect injury. 145
Officers’ propensity to make arrests also seems to vary
with age. Though there is limited information available
about nonarrest decisions, in absolute terms, younger
officers make more arrests than older ones, 146 though it may
be experience, rather than age, that reduces arrest
frequency. 147 On the other hand, studies provide some
141. Roger G. Dunham & Geoffrey P. Alpert, Understanding the Dynamics of
Officer Age and Gender in Police Pursuits, 10 AM. J. POLICE, no. 3, 1991, at 51, 55.
142. Id. at 54 (finding officers in their twenties had a 36% likelihood of a
pursuit resulting in accident, a 26% likelihood of a pursuit resulting in injury and
a 53% likelihood of a pursuit resulting in any negative outcome, while the
outcomes for officers in their thirties were 35%, 20%, and 49% respectively, and
the outcomes for officers in their 40s were 23%, 18%, and 44% respectively).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 56.
145. Robert J. Kaminski, Jeff Rojek, Hayden P. Smith & Geoffrey P. Alpert,
Correlates of Foot Pursuit Injuries in the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department, 15 POLICE Q. 177, 190 (2012). The officers in the study were between
twenty-three and fifty-two years old. Id.
146. Peterson, supra note 132, at 46.
147. Sherman, supra note 129 (citing BRIAN FORST, JUDITH LUCIANOVIC &
SARAH J. COX, NAT’L INST. FOR L. ENF’T & CRIM. JUST., WHAT HAPPENS AFTER AN
ARREST? A COURT PERSPECTIVE OF POLICE OPERATIONS IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA 50 (1978)) (finding no difference in number of arrests by age when
controlling for length of service). It is worth considering, however, that the
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evidence that younger officers may struggle to maintain
productive relationships in the community. A 1996 study by
Kim Michelle Lersch and Tom Mieczkowski reviewed civilian
complaints against officers in a large police department in
the Southeast. 148 In that study, the department’s police
officers averaged 36.05 years old with an average of 11.97
years on the force. 149 The average age of an officer with
civilian complaints over a three-year period was younger, at
31.67 years old, and “repeat offenders”, those who received
five or more complaints during the three-year period, were
younger still, at 30.20 years old on average. 150 As in the
McElvain and Kposowa study, the median age of officers was
not reported, nor was the frequency of different ages in the
sample. In addition, though the study found that about 7% of
officers accounted for more than one-third of complaints over
the three-year period, the study could not provide insight
into whether the older officers who received complaints also
received them when they were younger, or if there was any
relationship between complaints and the officer’s age when
hired. 151
A 1972 study by Bernard Cohen and Jan Chaiken
further suggested that not just age, but age at the time of
hire, affected the frequency of civilian complaints against an
officer. 152 Use of force complaints accounted for the marginal
department in question, D.C.’s Metropolitan Police Department, at that time had
an unusually low median age (twenty-seven) and most officers employed by MPD
at the time had fewer than five years of experience. FORST, LUCIANOVIC & COX,
supra note 147, at 49. Studies of non-arrest decisions have focused on encounter
and suspect characteristics to the exclusion of officer characteristics. See, e.g.,
William Terrill & Eugene A. Paoline III, Nonarrest Decision Making in Police–
Citizen Encounters, 10 POLICE Q. 308, 309 (2007); Jennifer L. Schulenberg,
Moving Beyond Arrest and Reconceptualizing Police Discretion: An Investigation
into the Factors Affecting Conversation, Assistance, and Criminal Charges, 18
POLICE Q. 244, 246 (2015).
148. Lersch & Mieczkowski, supra note 117, at 30.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 33–34.
151. Id. at 37.
152. BERNARD

COHEN

&

JAN

M.

CHAIKEN,
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increase in complaints for officers who were younger when
hired. 153 Though those officers were no more likely to have
substantiated complaints, it also seems that the complaints
were not a result of increased exposure to the public, since in
the Cohen and Chaiken study, officers who were older when
appointed were more like to have non-supervisory field
assignments than those who were younger when they were
appointed. 154
A more recent study of the traits of officers engaged in
career-ending misconduct in the New York City Police
Department found that increased age at appointment was a
protective factor against career-ending misconduct, though
other traits, such as time on the force and education, had
stronger protective effects. 155 The protective value of age also
appears to be limited with respect to successful completion of
the first, probationary year of employment. 156
Criminologists have also studied the effects of
experience, which strongly correlates with officer age,
though the variables are not interchangeable. Outcomes of
studies examining the effect of officer experience on the use
of force vary. Some studies find that more experienced
officers use less force, though studies have also found no
significant relationship or correlations that vary with the
type or degree of force. 157 On the other hand, increased
CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE 62–64 (1972).
153. Id.
154. Id. Other studies have cautioned against over-interpreting lack of
complaint substantiation, noting that officers with repeat complaints against
them tend to be accused of more serious misconduct, and that more serious
allegations have the lowest likelihood of being sustained. See Lersch &
Mieczkowski, supra note 117, at 40–41.
155. Kane & White, supra note 128, at 757.
156. Decker & Huckabee, supra note 105, at 800 (noting that only one of the
twenty recruits who did not complete the probationary year was under twentyfive years of age and finding that education was more protective). The study did
not identify the reason the recruit failed to complete the probationary year, nor
did the study consider the long-term effects of hiring age. Id.
157. For studies finding a negative relationship between officer experience and
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experience is a protective factor against career-ending
misconduct. 158 This may be because studies tend to
demonstrate that officers’ problem behavior peaks in their
second and third years of experience and declines
thereafter. 159
Officers’ methods of forming suspicion may also change
over the course of their careers. A study of police in
Savannah, Georgia, examined how officer experience related
to nonbehavioral suspicion, defined as an officer’s suspicion
based on “an individual’s appearance, the time and place,

use of force, see Paoline & Terrill, supra note 117, at 188 (finding officers with
less experience tended to use more force, defined as both physical and verbal
force, than those with more experience). In this study, the group of officers most
likely to use force was those with three to five years of experience, not those with
two or fewer years of experience. Id.; see Eugene A. Paoline, III & William Terrill,
Women Police Officers and the Use of Coercion, 15 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST., no. 3–
4, 2004, at 97, 109 (finding that male officers with less experience were more
likely to use force); Robert J. Kaminski, Clete DiGiovanni & Raymond Downs,
The Use of Force Between the Police and Persons with Impaired Judgment, 7
POLICE Q. 311, 324 (2004) (finding that officers with more experience (three to
five years) were less likely to use force than officers with less experience (zero to
two years)); Kop & Euwema, supra note 129 (finding more experienced officers
were more likely to use force). For studies finding a non-significant relationship
between officer experience and use of force, see Terrill, Leinfelt & Kwak, supra
note 117, at 69 (finding that only suspect intoxication and resistance, not officer
characteristics, reached statistical significance); Brian A. Lawton, Levels of
Nonlethal Force: An Examination of Individual, Situational, and Contextual
Factors, 44 J. RSCH. CRIME & DELINQ. 163, 176 (2007) (finding that officer
experience did not have a statistically significant effect on nonlethal force);
McCluskey, Terrill & Paoline, supra note 45, at 30 (finding no statistically
significant effect of officer experience on use of force); John D. McCluskey &
William Terrill, Departmental and Citizen Complaints as Predictors of Police
Coercion, 28 POLICING 513, 524–25 (2005) (finding no correlation between officer
experience and use of force). For studies finding different results depending on
the type or degree of force, see Crawford & Burns, supra note 133, at 55 (finding
that more experienced officers were more likely to use either no force or a firearm,
but less likely to use restraints); Eugene V. Morabito & William G. Doerner,
Police Use of Less-Than-Lethal Force: Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Spray, 20
POLICING 680, 689 (finding veteran officers more likely to resort to OC spray).
158. Kane & White, supra note 128, at 757.
159. Christopher J. Harris, Exploring the Relationship Between Experience and
Problem Behaviors: A Longitudinal Analysis of Officers from a Large Cohort, 12
POLICE Q. 192, 202 (2009).
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and descriptive information provided to an officer.” 160 The
study found that officers with more experience were more
likely to be suspicious of a person based on nonbehavioral
criteria but did not find a correlation between nonbehavioral
suspicion and an officer’s decision to stop someone. 161 Studies
also tend to demonstrate that more experienced police are
less active in all types of police duties than less experienced
officers. 162
It is not clear, however, that more experienced officers’
inactivity burdens their departments. A survey of studies
showed that despite being less active, more experienced
officers’ arrests were more likely to result in convictions. 163
More experienced officers were also found to be friendlier in
dealing with the public than their less experienced
counterparts, though studies diverged in their findings of
whether officers’ congeniality extended to people who were
160. Geoffrey P. Alpert, John M. MacDonald & Robert G. Dunham, Police
Suspicion and Discretionary Decision Making During Citizen Stops, 43
CRIMINOLOGY 407, 419 (2005).
161. Id. at 422. Though the finding was not statistically significant, the
authors of the study felt it was “close enough to be noteworthy given [their] small
sample size.” Id. at 422–23.
162. John P. Crank, Legalistic and Order-Maintenance Behavior Among Police
Patrol Officers: A Survey of Eight Municipal Police Agencies, 12 AM. J. POLICE,
no. 1, 1993, at 103, 114, 118. The study defined legalistic tasks as “issu[ing] nontraffic citations, mak[ing] custodial traffic arrests, issu[ing] traffic citations, and
search[ing] cars under independent probable cause,” while it defined
“establish[ing] rapport with citizens on the beat, mediat[ing] civil disputes,
mediat[ing] family disputes, and verbally warn[ing] offenders instead of
arresting” as order-maintenance activities. Id. at 110; Sherman, supra note 129,
at 73 (reviewing studies that show that less experienced officers “initiate more
citizen contacts, do more active preventative patrolling, and record crime reports
from citizens more often than do officers with more experience, particularly than
those with more than eight years of service” (citing Robert James Friedrich, The
Impact of Organizational, Individual, and Situational Factors on Police Behavior
278–84 (1977) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (ProQuest 7804704))).
163. Sherman, supra note 129, at 73 (citing FORST, LUCIANOVIC & COX, supra
note 147, at 48–49). The concern that more experienced officers’ less frequent use
of the arrest power burdens their departments also takes for granted that a
department that wields its arrest power more frequently is doing better
policing—a contested premise. See, e.g., Rachel A. Harmon, Why Arrest?, 115
MICH. L. REV. 307, 313–20 (2016).
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suspects or only to those who were not. 164 Despite the many
studies showing correlations between policing outcomes and
experience, one meta-analysis by Colin Bolger suggests that
officer demographics overall play little role in officer use of
force decisions. 165
Christopher Chapman addresses the important
distinction between age and experience in his study on use of
force in communities of color. 166 Chapman’s study, which
examined survey responses from police in Newark,
Elizabeth, and Orange, New Jersey, indicated that younger
officers used more force, but found that despite a strong
correlation between age and experience, age and experience
did not influence police use of force in the same way. 167 He
found that “[a]t any given age, an officer with more
experience used more force compared to others of the same
age.” 168 Though studies sometimes attribute more
experienced officers’ decreased use of force to decreased
citizen engagement and differing job duties, Chapman
controlled for job assignment. 169 He found younger patrol
officers used force more frequently than older officers, and
more experienced patrol officer used higher levels of force
than less experienced officers but received fewer

164. Sherman, supra note 129, at 73 (first citing Friedrich, supra note 162, at
278–79; and then citing DANIEL CRUSE & JESSE RUBIN, NAT’L INST. OF L. ENF’T &
CRIM. JUST., DETERMINANTS OF POLICE BEHAVIOR 8 (1973)).
165. Bolger, supra note 128, at 479 (finding that male officers were 1.11 times
more likely to use force but that other officer characteristics were not significant).
The study did examine the effects of experience but did not examine the effects
of age. Id. at 479.
166. Christopher Chapman, Use of Force in Minority Communities is Related
to Police Education, Age, Experience, and Ethnicity, 13 POLICE PRAC. & RSCH. 421
(2012).
167. Id. at 424–25, 433.
168. Id. at 433.
169. See id. at 429, 432; see, e.g., McElvain & Kposowa, supra note 129, at 518
(positing that senior officers are less likely to use lethal force because they
“gravitate toward assignments that remove them from the risk of becoming
involved in a shooting incident”).
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complaints. 170 By contrast, among detectives, younger
detectives were more likely both to use force and to use
higher levels of force than older detectives. 171
Though the studies described provide a limited view into
the effects of age on policing outcomes, those that find age
effects make hypotheses about why younger officers might
use force more frequently or receive more civilian
complaints. One explanation is that younger officers tend to
be assigned to job duties that put them in more frequent
contact with civilians than older officers, who may have
moved on to supervisory or desk jobs. 172 Police
administrators sometimes even describe police who receive
more complaints as “more productive, aggressive officers
performing their duties to the best of their abilities.” 173 Yet
the Chapman study, which finds age effects even when
controlling for job assignments, calls this explanation into
question. 174 Another explanation is that older officers have
more experience, and with more experience, officers become
more discerning about the use of force and more capable of
communicating with civilians in ways that generate fewer
complaints. 175
None of these studies considers another explanation: the
developmental immaturity associated with emerging
adulthood. In recent years, advances have been made in
understanding how emerging adults’ brains continue to
change and develop beyond adolescence. 176 Studies show
that the impulsiveness and risk-taking inherent to youth
does not cease at eighteen years old. 177 Moreover,
170. Chapman, supra note 166, at 429.
171. Id.
172. See McElvain & Kposowa, supra note 129, at 51.
173. Lersch & Mieczkowski, supra note 117, at 40.
174. Chapman, supra note 166, at 429.
175. See Paoline & Terrill, supra note 117, at 193.
176. See infra Part III.
177. See infra Section III.B.1.
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psychological factors such as identity formation and
susceptibility to trauma have the potential to impact officers
appointed as emerging adults throughout their careers. 178 As
developmental science has gained acceptance elsewhere in
law, police departments’ hiring policies have failed to
implement changes that take account of how emerging adult
officers’ immaturity may affect police-civilian interactions
and police decision-making in problematic and sometimes
dangerous ways. These failures to change policy persist
despite the importance of departmental screening processes
because of “the low visibility of police work, the unique
opportunities for misconduct presented to police officers, and
the conflict that often exists between the police and the
public.” 179 Part III will analyze how emerging adult officers’
lack of developmental maturity makes them ill-equipped to
police our streets and may set them on a course to adopt
warrior cop mindsets throughout their careers.
III. DEVELOPING WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT
While emerging adult officers’ capacities at the time of
hiring alone raise questions about whether they are wellsuited for the pressures of police work, their development
within the social and legal context of law enforcement
agencies means that their capacities at the time of hire are
not the only cause for concern. A key insight of psychologists’
work on emerging adulthood is the continuation of identity
formation well into the mid-twenties. 180 Emerging adults
remain in a critical developmental period that has long-term
implications for their functioning as adults. Emerging adults
are at an elevated risk of developing psychiatric disorders,
and they are more likely to develop neuroticism after

178. See infra Section III.C.
179. Kane & White, supra note 128, at 765 (explaining why police need
departmental screening in a discussion of criminal history screening).
180. Arnett, supra note 34, at 473; Wood et al., supra note 31, at 124.
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exposure to traumatic events. 181 Emerging adults’
susceptibility to trauma raises grave concerns for emerging
adult officers’ well-being, job performance, and longevity in
their careers. While police in every age category face
traumatic events, 182 adverse experiences leave greater
marks on emerging adults than older ones. 183 But it is not
only the high-stress circumstances of the job that shape
emerging adult officers’ development. 184 Given that
emerging adults demonstrate environmental sensitivity that
manifests in changes to identity and personality, it is also
important to consider how the social and legal contexts of law
enforcement shape emerging adult officers as they age.
A. Training: The Occupational Socialization of Emerging
Adult Officers
Emerging adults’ identities are still cohering, making
them especially vulnerable to adopting the worldviews of
those around them. As a result, the intense occupational
socialization process of police training may be particularly
potent for emerging adult recruits. 185 Occupational

181. Adriel Boals, Shana Southard-Dobbs & Heidemarie Blumenthal, Adverse
Events in Emerging Adulthood Are Associated with Increases in Neuroticism, 83
J. PERSONALITY 202, 203 (2015).
182. See Konstantinos Papazoglou & Brooke McQuerrey Tuttle, Fighting
Police Trauma: Practical Approaches to Addressing Psychological Needs of
Officers, J. POLICE EMERGENCY RESPONSE, July-Sept. 2018, at 1–2.
183. See infra Section III.C.
184. While moments of high stress during policing undoubtedly occur (and give
cause to wonder whether emerging adults are well-suited to that type of police
work), most police officers report organizational stressors being more stressful
than policing-specific job stresses. See Kop & Euwema, supra note 129, at 646.
185. Cf. Margie T. Britz, The Police Subculture and Occupational
Socialization: Exploring Individual and Demographic Characteristics, 21 AM. J.
CRIM. JUST. 127, 143 (1997) (indicating officers between twenty and twenty-five
were most likely to report feeling they were “part of the gang” and positing that
“[y]ounger officers may display a need for organizational belongingness”); Allison
T. Chappell & Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, Police Academy Socialization: Understanding
the Lessons Learned in a Paramilitary-Bureaucratic Organization, 39 J.
CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 187, 189 (2010) (“Because new police recruits tend to be
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socialization refers to the process whereby experienced
members of the profession communicate the organization’s
culture to new members. 186 The concept of occupational
socialization can be applied across different fields. Studies
have examined socialization among new professional
students, nurses, and factory workers, social workers, IT
personnel, and miners. 187
Police culture or subculture is often defined as
hierarchical, paramilitary, and having an us/them
orientation. 188 As a result, the concept of police culture is
most often invoked to describe negative features of police or
policework that prevent reform or stand in the way of
accountability. 189 As Eugene Paoline describes, policing
culture, characterized by intense group loyalty and social
isolation from people outside law enforcement, is a way of
managing the occupational stress and anxiety endemic to the
social environment of policing. 190 While policing culture adds
to organizational cohesion and insulates officers from job
stress, it can also have the effect of encouraging secrecy,
promoting unhealthy emotional and psychological coping
mechanisms, resisting accountability, and endorsing abuse
of authority in pursuit of order maintenance. 191 Police
culture is also undoubtedly shaped by being overwhelmingly
white, middle class, and male. 192 Even with the prevalence

young and impressionable, the academy is able to mold them to accept the
organizational culture.”).
186. See generally Britz, supra note 185.
187. Id. at 128; Paoline, supra note 39, at 161.
188. See Kappeler, Sluder & Alpert, supra note 60, at 191.
189. See Eugene A. Paoline III, Taking Stock: Toward a Richer Understanding
of Police Culture, 31 J. CRIM. JUST. 199, 200 (2003); see also Seth W. Stoughton,
Principled Policing: Warrior Cops and Guardian Officers, 51 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 611, 667 (2016).
190. Paoline, supra note 39, at 166.
191. Id. at 160; Kappeler, Sluder & Alpert, supra note 60, at 198–99.
192. Kappeler, Sluder & Alpert, supra note 60, at 192 (describing the
homogeneity of police recruits).
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of common features across law enforcement, 193 police culture
is not monolithic, with important variations between
organizations, locations, officer workgroups, and officer
ranks. 194
Police acculturation begins in earnest at the academy. 195
Even with a shift toward community-oriented policing
models, police training remains focused on tactics and
physicality. 196 Police instructors are typically former street
officers whose instruction “serves to reinforce the existing
police view of the world rather than to educate police recruits
or to provide the appropriate attitudes, values, and
beliefs.” 197 Police academies also employ methods featured in
boot camps, such as “stress, an emphasis on chain of
command, and group punishments and discipline.” 198 Where

193. One police scholar, John Crank, observed, “[S]treet cops everywhere tend
to share a common culture because they respond to similar audiences
everywhere.” Paoline, supra note 39, at 167.
194. Id. at 167–76.
195. Norman Conti argues that pre-professional socialization begins even
before police join the academy, as they vie for selection and must demonstrate a
particular set of norms and values. See generally Norman Conti, Role Call:
Preprofessional Socialization into Police Culture, 16 POLICING & SOC’Y 221, 223–
24 (2006). The view of pre-professional socialization is also related to a
personality-based model of police behavior (the pre-dispositional model) that has
led some researchers to conclude that people who have authoritarian
personalities are attracted to policing as a profession. See generally Kappeler,
Sluder & Alpert, supra note 60.
196. See Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, supra note 185, at 186–87; Kappeler,
Sluder & Alpert, supra note 60, at 193 (“[M]ost training curricula overemphasize
the potential for death and injury and further reinforce the danger notion by
spending an inordinate amount of time on firearms skills, dangerous calls, and
‘officer survival.’ The training orientation often resembles preparation for being
dropped behind enemy lines on a combat mission.”); Akbar, supra note 6, at 1808;
Friedman, supra note 41, at 1907. The emphasis on the physical demands of
police work and use of screening mechanisms based on those demands adversely
impact the participation of women in policing. See generally Lonsway, supra note
105.
197. Kappeler, Sluder & Alpert, supra note 60, at 193.
198. Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, supra note 185, at 189; see also Bruce L. Berg,
First Day at the Police Academy: Stress-Reaction-Training as a Screening-Out
Technique, 6 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST., May 1990, at 89, 95.
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academies have tried to shift to learner-centered models
based on other forms of adult education, complications have
arisen because of the clash between the more communityoriented messages of classroom training and the “hidden
curriculum” of “war stories” and field training. 199
Researchers tend to find that the “hidden curriculum”
supports the traditional police subculture. 200
Socialization into police work continues as officers begin
patrolling under their field training officers (FTOs). 201
Learning in the field is frequently presented as more
important and relevant than what was learned in the
academy. 202 It also has the tendency to reinforce “hidden
curriculum” messages. One reason for this might be the
selection of field training officers. FTOs are not always wellscreened and sometimes have their own extensive
misconduct histories. 203 FTOs with misconduct histories or
those who are poorly trained themselves have a statistically
significant effect on subsequent misconduct by their
trainees. 204 Science suggests emerging adults may be even
199. Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, supra note 185, at 192; see also S.G. Stradling,
G. Crowe & A.P. Tuohy, Changes in Self-Concept During Occupational
Socialization of New Recruits to the Police, 3 J. CMTY. & APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 131,
145 (1993) (explaining that the initial effects of formal classroom socialization
dissipate with time as informal socialization takes root).
200. See Robert E. Ford, Saying One Thing, Meaning Another: The Role of
Parables in Police Training, 6 POLICE Q. 84, 100 (2003) (finding 83% of police “war
stories” supported police subcultural values).
201. Paoline, supra note 39, at 165.
202. See id.; Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, supra note 185, at 209.
203. Simone Weichselbaum, One Roadblock to Police Reform: Veteran Officers
Who Train Recruits, MARSHALL PROJECT (July 22, 2020, 6:00 AM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/07/22/one-roadblock-to-police-reformveteran-officers-who-train-recruits. The murder of George Floyd underscored the
insufficient screening of field training officers for misconduct histories. Thomas
Lane, one of the officers charged with George Floyd’s murder, was a relatively
recent recruit, trained by Derek Chauvin, the officer who knelt on George Floyd’s
neck. See id.
204. See Brendan McGinley, Winifred Agnew-Pauley, Lisa Tompson & Jyoti
Belur, Police Recruit Training Programmes: A Systematic Map of Research
Literature, 14 POLICING 52, 58 (2020). Further, FTOs are frequently untrained in
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more susceptible to adopting their training officers’
perspectives and less likely to question orders than older
recruits. Similarly, while police leaders argue that emerging
adult officers are more easily integrated into the
organizational culture, when that culture reflects anti-Black
bias, a military mindset, or other undesirable features, a
more established identity and personality would serve as a
bulwark against adoption of the negative aspects of that
culture.
Criminological studies of the social contagion effect give
further credence to the influence of social context on policing
outcomes. Criminologists who study social contagion argue
that officers’ peers serve as “social conduits” through which
misconduct is propagated. 205 Given that peer presence and
peer imitation have far greater behavioral effects on
emerging adults than older adults, 206 there is reason to be
concerned that emerging adult officers would be especially
vulnerable to repeating the behaviors of their misbehaving
policing partners. This has further support in a study of
officers’ use of force and peer group aggressiveness, which
showed that more experienced officers resisted using higher
levels of force endorsed by so-called “high aggressive” peer
groups, while less experienced officers used more force when
situated in high aggressive peer groups. 207
Studies of police socialization have also revealed changes
to interpersonal behavior. One study found that after
completing their probationary year, new officers’ empathy
community policing, even if their organizations have ostensibly adopted the
model. See Robin N. Haarr, The Making of a Community Policing Officer: The
Impact of Basic Training and Occupational Socialization on Police Recruits, 4
POLICE Q. 402, 406 (2001).
205. See Marie Ouellet, Sadaf Hashimi, Jason Gravel & Andrew V.
Papachristos, Network Exposure and Excessive Use of Force: Investigating the
Social Transmission of Police Misconduct, 18 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 675, 675
(2019).
206. See discussion supra Section II.A.
207. See John D. McCluskey et al., Peer Group Aggressiveness and the Use of
Coercion in Police-Suspect Encounters, 6 POLICE PRAC. & RSCH. 19, 31–32 (2005).
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decreased. 208 Likewise, there is evidence that early police
socialization affects how police choose to exercise their
discretion. 209 The effects of the social context of law
enforcement agencies are further exacerbated by the ways
law and discipline fail to constrain police officers.
B. On the Job: Psychosocial and Neurobiological
Characteristics of Emerging Adult Officers
Though socialization into the department will affect
emerging adults both in the short-term and as they rise
through
the
ranks,
additional
psychosocial
and
neurobiological capacity issues are likely to plague emerging
adult officers as they police our streets. The Supreme Court’s
oft-quoted words in Graham v. Connor describe policing in
terms that make clear why emerging adult officers’
psychosocial capacities may be overwhelmed by their work
environment: “Police officers are often forced to make splitsecond judgments—in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force
that is necessary in a particular situation.” 210
Though it is possible that emerging adult officers may
differ somewhat in their level of development from the
median emerging adult in the population, there is no
available scientific evidence that demonstrates that
emerging adult officers have more developed brains or
psychosocial capacities than other emerging adults.
Therefore, it is important to consider the general capacities
of emerging adults when thinking about how emerging adult
officers might act on the job. 211

208. See Stradling et al., supra note 199, at 146.
209. See A.P. Tuohy, M.J. Wrennall, R.A. McQueen & S.G. Stradling, Effect of
Socialization Factors on Decisions to Prosecute: The Organizational Adaptation
of Scottish Police Recruits, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 167, 168 (1993).
210. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
211. A question beyond the scope of this Article is whether police departments
could be held liable for hiring emerging adult officers who are developmentally
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1. Risky Decision-Making, Risk Behaviors, and
Impulsivity
Though recent Supreme Court jurisprudence recognizes
that adolescents tend to make risky decisions and engage in
high-risk behaviors, it tends to overlook that emerging
adults, not adolescents, are the most prevalent age category
in terms of high-risk behaviors. 212 This includes behaviors
like substance use and risky driving behaviors. 213 Though
emerging and older adults express similar risk preference,
their behavior in high-risk decision-making diverges. 214 One
study found that younger people, including youth (defined as
age eighteen to twenty-two) are more likely to select a risky
course of action as compared to older adults. 215 Notably,
different features of self-control develop on unique
trajectories. 216 Though sensation-seeking, characterized by
“novelty, emotion, and reward,” peaks from fifteen to
seventeen before declining in adulthood, impulsivity, defined
as “a tendency to act rapidly without deliberation or
consideration,” steadily declines from childhood into the
unable to adhere to a reasonable person standard in hot-cognition scenarios. The
Supreme Court has recognized developmentally informed reasonableness
standards in criminal procedure, see J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 279–
81 (2011) (establishing a reasonable child standard for the Miranda custody
analysis), but civil courts have not traditionally excused children from adult
standards of reasonableness when voluntarily taking on abnormally dangerous
activities, like driving. William Binchy, The Adult Activities Doctrine in
Negligence Law, 11 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 733, 735 (1985).
212. Arnett, supra note 34, at 475.
213. Id.
214. See Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk Taking,
Risk Preference, and Risky Decision Making in Adolescence and Adulthood: An
Experimental Study, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCH. 625, 630 (2005) (reporting
chronological age difference in risk-taking but not on risk preference).
215. See id. at 629–30. This study compared youth aged eighteen to twentytwo with adults aged twenty-four and older. See id. at 626. The mean age of the
youth sample was 18.78 with a standard deviation of 1.07, while the mean age of
the adult group was 37.24 with a standard deviation of 12.37. See id. at 626.
216. See Callie H. Burt, Gary Sweeten & Ronald L. Simons, Self-Control
Through Emerging Adulthood: Instability, Multidimensionality, and
Criminological Significance, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 450, 457–58 (2014).
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thirties. 217
The risk-prone decision-making that characterizes
emerging adulthood provides a developmental explanation
for studies that find younger officers are more inclined to use
force. 218 Emerging adult officers’ impulsivity may also
explain the findings of Dunham and Alpert’s study of highspeed chases, since emerging adults’ predisposition to act
without deliberation makes them more inclined than older
officers to pursue high-risk, high-reward encounters. 219 The
likelihood of engaging in high-risk behaviors interacts in
troubling ways with peer effects and lack of capacity in

217. See id. at 457–58.
218. One area of research that tends to suggest that concerns about emerging
adult officer development are warranted are studies demonstrating a
relationship between officer self-control and policing outcomes. See, e.g.,
Christopher M. Donner, Jon Maskaly, Alex Piquero & Wesley G. Jennings, Quick
on the Draw: Assessing the Relationship Between Low Self-Control and OfficerInvolved Police Shootings, 20 POLICE Q. 213, 224 (2017) (finding that low-selfcontrol officers are more likely to engage in deadly police shootings); see also
Christopher M. Donner & Wesley G. Jennings, Low Self-Control and Police
Deviance: Applying Gottfredson and Hirschi’s General Theory to Officer
Misconduct, 17 POLICE Q. 203, 215–17 (2014) (finding low self-control a
significant predictor of citizen complaints for physical and verbal abuse, an
internal affairs investigation, and engaging in misconduct); Christopher M.
Donner, Lorie A. Firedell & Wesley G. Jennings, The Relationship Between SelfControl and Police Misconduct: A Multi-Agency Study of First-Line Police
Supervisors, 43 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 841, 852 (2016) (finding that first-line
police supervisors with lower self-control were more likely to self-report both past
misconduct and the likelihood of future misconduct). These studies varied with
respect to findings of correlation with age. Compare Donner, Maskaly, Piquero &
Jennings, Quick on the Draw, supra, at 224 (finding no significant correlation
with age with respect to deadly shootings), with Donner & Jennings, Low SelfControl and Police Deviance, supra, at 216 (finding a negative correlation
between age and misconduct). It is worth noting that the two studies of line
officers relied on Gottfredson and Hirschi’s self-control theory, which posits
stable self-control between individuals after childhood and has been called into
question by studies that demonstrate that self-control changes over time. See
Burt et al., supra note 216, at 455. Moreover, though some studies suggest
relative stability of self-control as compared to one’s age cohort, overall selfcontrol increases with development. See id. at 454.
219. See Dunham & Alpert, supra note 141, at 54 (noting dangerousness of
high-speed chases and confirming that younger officers’ vehicle pursuits are more
likely to end with negative results).
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emotional reasoning and self-regulation as discussed below.
Emerging adult officers’ risk-inclination may also
explain why studies often suggest that younger officers are
more “active” than older police officers. 220 This means that
younger officers may be more likely to chase suspects on foot
or in cars, stop more civilians, and make more arrests. As
described in Part I, the law empowers police to make as much
contact with civilians as they desire, so younger officers may
choose to put themselves in positions to use force more
frequently. 221
2. Peer Presence and Influence
Police deployment patterns strain emerging adults’
capacity to manage themselves around peers. Studies
indicate that peer presence, without any active pressure or
interference, causes adolescents to make riskier decisions. 222
Though adolescents are more influenced by peer presence
than emerging adults, 223 peer presence effects persist in
emerging adults’ risky decision-making. 224 One study
220. See Crank, supra note 162, at 118.
221. Ristroph, supra note 50, at 1192 (“Fourth Amendment law places great
importance on officer safety, and its usual strategy to protect officers is to expand
police authority to use force. An alternative approach, one that would protect
officers by minimizing officer-civilian contacts and conflicts, is markedly absent
from constitutional doctrine. Constitutional doctrine has steadily expanded the
occasions in which it permits and even encourages police to interrupt, detain, and
take custody of ordinary citizens. As police are asked to do more, they have been
empowered to use more force, especially if they sense danger.”).
222. See Jason Chein et al., Peers Increase Adolescent Risk Taking by
Enhancing Activity in the Brain’s Reward Circuitry, 14 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI., no.
2, at F1, F2 (2011).
223. Gardner & Steinberg, supra note 214, at 629–30.
224. Riedijk & Harakeh, supra note 29, at 260 (explaining that 69% of variance
between risk-taking was due to imitation of the risky decisions of peers). Notably,
this study also indicates that emerging adults’ self-identification as someone
susceptible to peer influence had no explanatory value. Id. at 260–61; see also
Graham & Wildman, supra note 29, at 263 (suggesting peer pressure
intervention programs designed for secondary schools be implemented in the
military and community groups, where they can be applied to emerging adult
participants).
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indicates that emerging adults strongly imitate the risky
decision-making of a single peer, even if that peer is a
complete stranger. 225 Though psychological theory explains
this behavior in several ways, 226 the outcomes demonstrate
that emerging adults make riskier choices in the presence of
their peers and based on peer imitation. Given that police
officers are most often deployed with other similarly situated
officers, their likelihood of making riskier choices may be
high in general. This peer effect also means that the social
contagion effect could be more dramatic in emerging adult
officers, causing risky behavior or misconduct to spread
through police networks. 227
3. Emotional Reasoning and Errors in Self-Regulation
While emerging adults self-regulate better than
adolescents, they still show a marked difference from older
adults, especially when it comes to emotional regulation of
anger and fear. 228 Importantly, the conditions under which
emerging adults are particularly susceptible to impulsive,
risky, or emotionally reasoned behavior maps closely onto
the types of scenarios abundant in policing and emphasized
by policing’s social environment. 229 In high-threat situations,
emerging adults “are still easily swayed by their emotions to
distort their thinking in self-serving and self-protective
225. Riedijk & Harakeh, supra note 29, at 256.
226. Id. at 256–57.
227. See supra Section II.B.
228. See Peter Zimmerman & Alexandra Iwanski, Emotion Regulation from
Early Adolescence to Emerging Adulthood and Middle Adulthood: Age
Differences, Gender Differences, and Emotion-Specific Developmental Variations,
38 INT’L J. BEHAV. DEV. 182, 192 (2014).
229. Officers may be more likely to perceive threat generally based on training
techniques in which they are advised that they are constantly under threat and,
in turn, become hypervigilant. See generally Stoughton, supra note 60. This type
of training is particularly likely to influence emerging adult officers because of
their threat sensitivity, increased likelihood of trauma reactions in this stage of
development, and tendency toward emotional reasoning. See supra Part II
(discussing danger as an important component of the social environment of
policing); supra Part III (describing the characteristics of emerging adulthood).
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ways,” often at the expense of out-group members. 230
In a study that considered adolescents, young adults
(eighteen to twenty-one), and adults (twenty-two to twentyfive), young adults were less able than adults to respond
accurately when presented with negative facial expressions,
and when under a threat condition, the accuracy of their
responses further diminished relative to those of adults. 231
These errors demonstrate a lack of control among young
adults under threatening or fearful circumstances. 232 A
similar study tracked adolescents’ (twelve to fifteen),
emerging adults’ (eighteen to twenty-five), and adults’
(twenty-six to forty-six) performance on a go/no-go task. The
study demonstrates that adults’ responses are slower but
more accurate as compared to emerging adults, and they
demonstrate less bias toward a go response. 233 These results
demonstrate that while emerging adults’ emotional
reasoning and self-regulation are more developed than that
of adolescents, they have not reached psychosocial maturity
with respect to those capacities.
A tendency toward inaccurate emotional reasoning and
230. Gisela Labouvie-Vief, Emerging Structures of Adult Thought, in
EMERGING ADULTS IN AMERICA: COMING OF AGE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 59, 79
(Jeffrey Jensen Arnett & Jennifer Lynn Tanner eds., 2006) (summarizing
research that shows that emerging adults are more likely to give “harsh
evaluations of moral transgressors” or “increase racist attitudes” in light of deathrelated threats or fears, but acknowledging that for a subset of high-empathy
emerging adults, death-related threat “increases acceptance of dissimilar
others”).
231. Alexandra O. Cohen et al., Corrigendum: When Is an Adolescent an Adult?
Assessing Cognitive Control in Emotional and Nonemotional Contexts, 27 PSYCH.
SCI. 549, 559 (2016). The study did not compare the adult group (twenty-two to
twenty-five) with an older cohort. Id.
232. Notably, while adolescents’ performance also diminished under an
excitement condition, that of young adults did not. Id. at 555.
233. See J.E. Cohen-Gilbert et al., Differential Influence of Safe Versus
Threatening Facial Expressions on Decision-Making During an Inhibitory
Control Task in Adolescence and Adulthood, 17 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 212, 220
(2014). Unlike other studies, this study showed a disruption based on a threat
stimulus across all age groups, not just those of younger participants. See id. at
220.
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errors in self-regulation suggests that emerging adult
officers are poorly equipped to deal with emotionally charged
situations. Errors in emotional reasoning may lead emerging
adult officers to escalate encounters, leading to unnecessary
uses of force or the power of arrest, especially in the face of
interactions with people they interpret as uncooperative,
disrespectful, or threatening. The go bias of emerging adult
officers also means they are more likely to react impulsively
under such circumstances, rather than employ a reasoned
response. While emerging adults’ over-perception of threat is
subconscious, it has real implications for how sincere but
inaccurate interpretations of policing encounters influence
emerging adult officers. 234

234. Though beyond the scope of this Article, emerging adult police officers’
errors in emotional reasoning may be particularly dangerous for communities of
color. The amygdala, which is still developing during emerging adulthood, is
responsible for emotional learning, including fear conditioning. See Bradley
Taber-Thomas & Koraly Perez-Edgar, Emerging Adulthood Brain Development,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EMERGING ADULTHOOD 126, 128 (Jeffrey Jensen
Arnett ed., 2015); Elizabeth A. Phelps et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of
Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
729, 729 (2000). Racialized perceptions of Black people as threatening,
aggressive, angry, armed, or dangerous might be exacerbated by emerging adult
officers’ tendency to over-perceive threat. See, e.g., Andrew R. Todd, Kelsey C.
Thiem & Rebecca Neel, Does Seeing Faces of Young Black Boys Facilitate the
Identification of Threatening Stimuli?, 27 PSYCH. SCI. 384, 385, 390–91 (2016);
William A. Cunningham et al., Separable Neural Components in the Processing
of Black and White Faces, 15 PSYCH. SCI. 806, 811 (2004); Kurt Hugenberg &
Galen V. Bodenhausen, Ambiguity in Social Categorization: The Role of Prejudice
and Facial Affect in Race Categorization, 15 PSYCH. SCI. 342, 342–45 (2004); John
Paul Wilson, Nicholas O. Rule & Kurt Hugenberg, Racial Bias in Judgments of
Physical Size and Formidability: From Size to Threat, 113 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. 59, 65–66 (2017); Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime,
and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 876, 877, 887–88 (2004);
B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and Controlled
Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 181, 183,
185, 188 (2001); Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: Using
Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1314, 1314–1315, 1319 (2002); E. Ashby Plant & B.
Michelle Peruche, The Consequences of Race for Police Officers’ Responses to
Criminal Suspects, 16 PSYCH. SCI. 180, 180–82 (2005).
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4. Sex and Gender Considerations 235
Police agencies disproportionately employ male
officers. 236 This, too, has implications for the behavior of
emerging adult officers, though findings on gender and sex
effects are mixed. 237 At younger ages, men give greater
235. The studies discussed herein use a binary construct of sex and gender that
the author recognizes misrepresents the current understanding of the spectrum
of gender identities, may lead to misclassification of study participants, and,
according to some psychologists, violates scientific ethical standards. See Jessica
J. Cameron & Danu Anthony Stinson, Gender (Mis)Measurement: Guidelines for
Respecting Gender Diversity in Psychological Research, 13 SOC. & PERSONALITY
PSYCH. COMPASS, no. 11, Nov. 2019, at 2. These studies do not capture or explain,
for instance, how a trans man or woman or person who identifies as non-binary
might respond similarly to or differently from those who share their sex assigned
at birth. Trans or non-binary officers would almost inevitably have their own
perspectives on policing, see Rick Rojas, Transgender on the Force, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/07/nyregion/transgender-onthe-force.html. To the extent that they join the force as emerging adults, this
article speaks to their psychosocial capacities, though the effects of their gender
identity on those capacities is not captured by available studies. Id.
236. Nationally, 72.8% of the 1,003,270 law enforcement employees are male
and 27.2% are female. FBI Crim. Just. Info. Servs. Div., Table 74: Full-Time Law
Enforcement Employees by Population Group Percent Male and Female, 2019,
2019 Crime in the United States, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2019/crimein-the-u.s.-2019/tables/table-74 (last visited Jan. 22, 2022). When considering
only sworn officers, the disparity grows: of the 697,195 officers in the United
States, 87.2% are male and 12.8% are female. Id. One group, called the 30x30
Initiative, has set the goal of reaching 30% women in policing by 2030 with the
explicit goal of influencing organizational culture. A National Initiative to
Advance Women in Policing, 30X30, https://30x30initiative.org/about-30x30/ (last
visited Jan. 22, 2022). The report that serves as the basis for the organization,
Women in Policing: Breaking Barriers and Blazing a Path, cites meta-analyses
that have found that female officers are less likely to use force while male officers
engage in misconduct more frequently. See NAT’L INST. JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
WOMEN IN POLICING: BREAKING BARRIERS AND BLAZING A PATH 20 (2019),
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/252963.pdf (citing Bolger, supra note 128). See
generally Natalie Todak, The Decision to Become a Police Officer in a Legitimacy
Crisis, 27 WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 250 (2017); Timothy M. Maher, Police Sexual
Misconduct: Female Police Officers’ Views Regarding Its Nature and Extent, 20
WOMEN & CRIM. JUST. 263 (2010).
237. See Zimmerman & Iwanski supra note 228, at 192 (finding no gender
difference in adaptive emotional regulation among adolescents and emerging
adults but finding differences in types of emotional regulation); see also Oliver P.
John & James J. Gross, Healthy and Unhealthy Emotion Regulation: Personality
Processes, Individual Differences, and Life Span Development, 72 J. PERSONALITY
1301, 1311 (2004) (reporting differences in use of emotion suppression between
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weight than women to the benefits of risky decisions, and
they weigh those benefits even more heavily when in the
presence of peers. 238 One meta-analysis suggested that risktaking diverged along gender lines more during emerging
adulthood than during any other period of development. 239
The difference in risk-taking also varies by activity. 240 The
differences between emerging adult men and women are
more pronounced when it comes to risky driving than
reckless sex or substance use. 241 Even so, gender differences
in risk-benefit consideration do not always manifest in
measures of risk taking or risky decision-making, 242 and not
all studies demonstrate gender or sex differences during
emerging adulthood. 243 Some studies also suggest that sexbased differences in risk-taking behavior are narrowing,
mediated more by culture than biology. 244 When gender and
sex-based differences are demonstrated, however, men tend
to show an increased likelihood of risky decision-making and
later attainment of psychosocial maturity. 245 Therefore, to

young men and young women); Alejandro Sanchis-Sanchis et al., Effects of Age
and Gender in Emotion Regulation of Children and Adolescents, 11 FRONTIERS
PSYCH. 1, 10 (2020) (explaining that emotional regulation differences between
girls and boys fluctuate with age, with girls scoring higher on emotional
regulation from nine to twelve and boys demonstrating better emotional
regulation from thirteen to sixteen).
238. Gardner & Steinberg, supra note 214, at 633.
239. See James P. Byrnes, David C. Miller & William D. Schafer, Gender
Differences in Risk-Taking: A Meta-Analysis, 125 PSYCH. BULL. 337, 367, 377
(1999).
240. Id. at 377.
241. See Graham Bradley & Karen Wildman, Psychosocial Predictors of
Emerging Adults’ Risk and Reckless Behaviors, 31 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 253,
261 (2002).
242. Id. at 259–64.
243. Cohen-Gilbert et al., supra note 233, at 220.
244. Laurence Steinberg, A Social Neuroscience Perspective on Adolescent
Risk-Taking, 28 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 78, 88 (2008).
245. See Christina L. Riggs Romaine, Psychosocial Maturity and Risk-Taking
in Emerging Adults: Extending Our Understanding Beyond Delinquency, 7
EMERGING ADULTHOOD 243, 247–48 (2019).
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the extent that gender and sex differences exist, mixedgender studies underestimate the extent to which emerging
adult officers, who are overwhelmingly male, exhibit a lack
of psychosocial capacities at the beginning of their careers.
C. Vulnerability and Attrition: Effects of Trauma, Chronic
Stress, and Adverse Experiences in Emerging Adulthood
Police officers’ work exposes them to significant stress
and trauma. 246 While healthy coping mechanisms can help
deal with the stress, a significant number of police use
avoidant coping mechanisms that decrease well-being. 247 As
a result, police officers sometimes struggle with mental
health, which manifests through high PTSD rates and
higher-than-expected suicide rates. 248 Studies also show that
police of all ages and genders are inclined to use substances,
particularly alcohol, to cope, which can further diminish
well-being and interfere with job performance. 249
246. See, e.g., Jordan DeVylder, Monique Lalane & Lisa Fedina, The
Association Between Abusive Policing and PTSD Symptoms Among U.S. Police
Officers, 10 J. SOC’Y FOR SOC. WORK & RSCH. 261, 262 (2019) (noting that police
experience more than three traumatic events every six months, and that 35% of
police who are exposed to traumatic events develop post-traumatic stress); Penny
Dick, The Social Construction of the Meaning of Acute Stressors: A Qualitative
Study of the Personal Accounts of Police Officers Using a Stress Counselling
Service, 14 WORK & STRESS 226, 226 (2000); Kim M.E. Janssens et al., Resilience
Among Police Officers: A Critical Systematic Review of Used Concepts, Measures,
and Predictive Values of Resilience, 36 J. POLICE & CRIM. PSYCH. 24, 24 (2021).
247. See Eamonn Arble, Ana M. Daugherty & Bengt B. Arnetz, Models of First
Responder Coping: Police Officers as a Unique Population, 34 STRESS & HEALTH
612, 615 (2018) (describing coping mechanisms used by police).
248. Id. at 612 (reporting PTSD rates between 7% and 19%); see also Justin
Fox et al., Mental Health Conditions, Barriers to Care, and Productivity Loss
Among Officers in An Urban Police Department, 76 CONN. MED. 525, 525–27
(2012) (describing higher-than-expected suicide rates and reporting a 23.8%
PTSD rates in one department). Self-reported involvement in police abuse is also
associated with PTSD symptoms of greater severity, though it is unclear whether
involvement in abuse is caused by, or simply correlated with, PTSD. DeVylder,
Lalne & Fedina, supra note 246, at 267–69.
249. Arble, Daugherty & Arnetz, supra note 247, at 613, 615; Fox et al. supra
note 248, at 527. But see Vicki Lindsay & Kyna Shelley, Social and Stress-Related
Influences of Police Officers’ Alcohol Consumption, 24 J. POLICE CRIM. PSYCH. 87,
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Concerns about officer well-being and its effects on job
performance are even graver for emerging adult officers.
Emerging adults are more vulnerable than older adults to
developing trauma symptoms and long-term effects after
traumatic events. 250 This appears to hold true for police
officers as well; in a study of police officers and trauma,
younger officers scored higher on measures of trauma
symptoms, 251 demonstrated less post-traumatic growth, 252
and tended to report higher stress exposure. 253
Chronic stress in emerging adulthood predicts
recurrence of major depressive disorder, with chronic
interpersonal stress having the greatest effect. 254 Work
stress can also hinder healthy coping, as high-stress work
environments have been shown to increase the likelihood of
developing drug dependence during this period of life. 255
Given the prevalence of risky behaviors in emerging
adulthood, it is unsurprising that studies of police alcohol use
show that younger officers are more at risk for “harmful and

91 (2009).
250. See Neal Krause, Benjamin A. Shaw & John Cairney, A Descriptive
Epidemiology of Lifetime Trauma and the Physical Health Status of Older Adults,
19 PSYCH. & AGING 637, 642 (2004) (showing that trauma experience between age
eighteen and thirty has the greatest effect on later-in-life health); Boals,
Southard-Dobbs & Blumenthal, supra note 181, at 203 (showing emerging adults
are more likely to develop psychiatric disorders and neuroticism as a result of
trauma).
251. DeVylder, Lalne & Fedina, supra note 246, at 265.
252. Arble, Daugherty & Arnetz, supra note 247, at 616.
253. Id. It is possible that the difference in stress exposure results from
different duty assignments. The study was distributed electronically to a
“representative sample” of police officers and did not control for duties. Id. at 614.
254. Erin S. Sheets & W. Edward Craighead, Comparing Chronic
Interpersonal and Noninterpersonal Stress Domains as Predictors of Depression
Recurrence in Emerging Adults, 63 BEHAVIOUR RSCH. & THERAPY 36, 39–40
(2014).
255. Philip L. Reed, Carla L. Storr & James C. Anthony, Drug Dependence
Enviromics: Job Strain in the Work Environment and Risk of Becoming DrugDependent, 163 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 404, 407 (2006).

334

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

hazardous” drinking behaviors. 256 The effects of chronic
stress and trauma on emerging adults suggest that police
who begin work as emerging adults are likely to have worse
physical and mental health outcomes, which are good neither
for them nor for their departments.
D. Discipline: The Legal Socialization of Emerging Adult
Officers
Laws, rules, and norms govern policing, but police
officers’ deference to them (or not) is, in part, a function of
their own legal attitudes and their belief in the legitimacy of
those who create and enforce the rules. Though by the time
emerging adult officers join the police force, they will have
developed their own civilian understanding of laws and
rules, occupational socialization also includes aspects of legal
socialization that define officers’ concepts of the legitimacy
and constraints of the laws and rules governing their role as
police.
Through the process of legal socialization, “individuals
acquire attitudes and beliefs about the law, legal authorities,
and legal institutions.” 257 While academy training formally
socializes recruits to the law governing policing, informal
messages are sent through training, experience, and
disciplinary practices. 258 Recruits can be socialized to new
beliefs and attitudes about the law through their own
personal experiences, but also through the stories told by

256. Lindsay & Shelley, supra note 249, at 91 (noting that younger officers
tended to cite their reason for drinking as to “fit in”).
257. Alex R. Piquero et al., Developmental Trajectories of Legal Socialization
Among Serious Adolescent Offenders, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 267, 267
(2005).
258. Very little time is spent on formal legal training. See Lynch, supra note
61, at 81, 86 (“[O]nly six percent of the overall average police academy curricula
are devoted to actually knowing and understanding the law.” And “the average
number of hours police academy training hours devoted solely to firearm training
increased from 63 hours in 2006 to 71 hours in 2013.”).
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others. 259 As a result, the messages sent through training,
peers, administrators, and unions can all play a role in the
legal socialization of emerging adult officers. Perhaps the
most salient aspect of legal socialization is the role that
legitimacy plays in securing compliance with the law. 260
The social environment of policing and occupational
socialization to the dominant police subculture play an
important role in undermining the legitimacy of the law
applicable to police officers. During police academy training,
recruits are told they must follow the law, but they are also
given messages that place police above and outside the
law. 261 In one study of the content of academy “war stories,”
a researcher found that of the stories that communicated a
position on the law, 11% supported unlawful behavior such
as the use of excessive force, illegal searches, or “testilying,”
while only 4% reinforced the law. 262
Other narratives focus on group loyalty and thereby
implicate the law. For instance, trainees may be told that
they should not write a speeding ticket for other officers they
pull over. 263 Signals expressing the importance of in-group
solidarity over police regulations are not limited to lowstakes instances like traffic violations. Allison Chappell and
Lonn Lanza-Kaduce describe a “war story” told during
259. Piquero et al, supra note 257 (stating the legal socialization process
“occurs though individuals’ interactions, both personal and vicarious, with police,
courts, and other legal actors.”).
260. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW: PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND COMPLIANCE (Yale Univ. Press 1990).
261. Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, supra note 185, at 202 (“One the one hand,
recruits were told that you ‘must follow laws outside of work’ and ‘must not think
you’re special.’ On the other hand, recruits picked up lessons that they were
different. ‘When you catch me speeding, you won’t write me a ticket.’ ‘You [an
officer] may break arms but as long as you do it correctly, or somewhat correctly,
it’s okay.’”).
262. Ford, supra note 200, at 100.
263. Chappell & Lanza-Kaduce, supra note 185, at 202. Other examples given
include drinking and driving on the job to “get “them” [sex workers] to believe I’m
not a cop” and justifying “screw up[s]” by “call[ing] it a ‘modified’ whatever and
say[ing] it was legal.” Id. at 203.
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academy training in which an officer shot and killed someone
during a traffic stop. Though the department took the
officer’s weapon, which was routine and done regardless of
fault, his fellow officers gave him their weapons immediately
thereafter, signifying loyalty and an organizational structure
that would protect its own. 264
While a story about loyalty in the face of administrative
procedure might demonstrate tension between the brass and
the rank and file, at other times, supervisors contribute to
the atmosphere of legal exceptionalism. “Supervisors have
been known to accept deficient reports, ignore serious
allegations of misconduct, and even encourage officers to
violate department rules. And they may be particularly
reluctant to enforce policies that they perceive to have been
foisted on the department by outsiders.” 265 Even when police
leaders acknowledge that officers have crossed the line, they
sometimes signal that misconduct is simply youthful
indiscretion or overzealousness, even though officers wield
power over life and death. 266
264. Id. at 203.
265. Ponomarenko, Rethinking Police Rulemaking, supra note 8, at 17
(footnotes omitted).
266. Even when officers are not particularly young, their misconduct is often
portrayed as youthful, male behavior. See, e.g., Robert Salonga, ‘Let’s Get This
Motherf—er’: San Jose Officer Benched After Viral Protest Comments, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS (May 31, 2020, 1:36 PM), https://www.mercurynews.com/2020
/05/31/lets-get-this-motherf-ker-san-jose-officers-viral-protest-comments-drawwide-condemnation/. After Officer Jared Yuen of the San Jose Police Department
was caught on camera shouting, “Let’s get this motherf—er” and “Shut up, bitch”
just before charging at protestors outfitted in full tactical gear and carrying a gun
loaded with rubber bullets, Police Chief Eddie Garcia said, “He’s a good kid and
a good cop.” Id. Though the police chief said he was not defending Yuen’s
statements, he attributed them to high emotions. See id. At the time, Yuen had
been employed by the San Jose Police Department for six years and was thirtythree years old. See Kristi Sturgill, Viral Twitter Video Shows San Jose Police
Officer Barking at a Protestor, ‘Shut Up, B—,’ L.A. TIMES (June 1, 2020, 6:26 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-06-01/viral-twitter-videocaptures-san-jose-police-officer-barking-at-a-protester-to-shut-up-bitch. Other
common slang used to describe police officers gives them a similar air of youth.
The “boys in blue” are not boys at all, at least according to the age of majority of
most U.S. states. See supra Part II.

2022]

DEVELOPING POLICE

337

Though a full exploration of the ways the law does or
does not constrain police officers’ behavior is outside the
scope of this Article, the environment of deference to police
decision-making combined with internal contestation of the
legitimacy of the law governing police shape the development
of emerging adult police officers. In the criminal law context,
Emily Buss argues that law should account for age by
acknowledging how the law itself shapes development. Law
influences development by establishing rules for how a
person relates to society and by shaping concepts of
accountability. 267 The policing environment leaves an
opportunity for rule-breaking because it is difficult to detect
transgressions as a result of the latitude and independence
of officers. 268 This may pose a problem for emerging adult
police officers, already prone to impulsivity, peer influence,
and errors in emotional regulation.
Compounding the formal oversight vacuum, emerging
adult officers can face informal, but consequential, sanctions
from their peers for deviating from customs and practices
within the police agency. 269 These informal sanctions can
keep officers in line—encouraging lawful and rightful
behavior—or they can promote illegal and wrongful
behavior. 270 A troubling USA Today investigation found a
pattern of retaliation against whistleblowers in
departments,
sometimes
with
official
sanction. 271
267. See Emily Buss, What the Law Should (and Should Not) Learn from Child
Development Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 48 (2009).
268. See supra Part I; see also KAPPELER, SLUDER & ALPERT, supra note 48, at
61.
269. KAPPELER, SLUDER & ALPERT, supra note 48, at 17.
270. Id.
271. See Gina Barton, Brett Murphy & Daphne Duret, Behind the Blue Wall:
Dead Rats, Death Threats, Destroyed Careers. How Law Enforcement Punishes
Its Whistleblowers, USA TODAY (Nov. 9, 2021), https://www.usatoday.com/indepth/story-series/2021/11/09/cops-report-excessive-force-risk-jobs/8514211002/
(“In South Carolina, an officer leaked the fact that fellow deputies beat a prisoner
who later died in custody. In Florida, a detective reported a captain who had
impregnated a 16-year-old girl and then paid for the abortion. In Oregon, a
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Retaliation, whether by peers or the brass, has powerful
socializing effects.
As emerging adult officers develop in an environment
that lacks accountability commensurate with their
responsibility, that lack of accountability shapes their
perception of self in relationship to society and its laws. As
Buss argues, at the extremes, a fractured sense of
accountability to society can lead to “a complete disrespect or
disregard for the law.” 272 The relative lawlessness inside
police departments may itself structure an emerging adult’s
vision of his relationship to society in ways that are troubling
for one who is supposed to be protecting and serving. 273
IV. DEVELOPING LESS HARMFUL POLICE
That emerging adults’ brains and behavior differ from
that of older adults should inform changes to existing
policing law and policy. 274 Though the precise boundaries of
psychosocial capacities remain unclear, we do know
emerging adults are unlikely to behave as mature,
reasonable adults in threatening, fast-moving situations
that require precise emotional reasoning. 275 This Part will
explore how policymakers and law enforcement agencies can
account for emerging adulthood. The recommendations in
this Part take the current social environment of policing as
given. While larger shifts in policing may obviate the need
for these interventions, they are offered as harm reduction
sergeant complained that a co-worker bragged about killing an unarmed
teenager. [⁋] After speaking out, all of them were forced out of their departments
and were branded traitors by their fellow officers.”).
272. Buss, supra note 267, at 53.
273. See TRAVIS HIRSCHI, CAUSES OF DELINQUENCY 16 (Transaction Publishers
2002) (1969) (describing the social control theory, which holds that delinquency
results when the bonds between an individual and society are broken).
274. Cohen et al., supra note 231, at 560 (stating that research on the
difference between younger and older adult behaviors should inform changes to
policies and laws).
275. See supra Part II.
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measures in the current legal and social climate.
A. Increase Minimum Hiring Ages
The current state of scientific knowledge demonstrates
that emerging adults are not developmentally prepared to
take on law enforcement roles, despite being eligible to be
hired by most police departments. Therefore, state
legislatures should increase law enforcement agencies’
minimum hiring ages to better reflect emerging adults’
developmental immaturity. While agencies could increase
minimum hiring ages on their own, there are reasons to
doubt they will do so or that such a change would be durable.
Increasing the minimum hiring age decreases departments’
discretion with respect to individual recruits and shrinks the
hiring pool. When police administrators have difficulty
hiring, there may be a temptation to lower the hiring age
despite the likely harms. A private, for-profit company,
Lexipol, now writes police policies for over 3,500 agencies in
thirty-five states—and tends to oppose reform. 276
Local or state governments, then, are a better avenue for
change, though the federal government should also
incentivize states to increase their hiring ages. A move
toward a higher and more uniform hiring age would help
avoid the spillover effects of officers in states with lower
minimum hiring ages moving to states or joining federal
agencies with higher minimum hiring ages. Before turning
to the viability of legislative minimum hiring age provisions,
I will explain why a minimum hiring age is more appropriate
than instituting minimum maturity standards for individual
officers.
Every bright-line rule suffers from a line-drawing
problem. 277 Yet aligning a particular job’s hiring criteria with
276. See Ingrid V. Eagly & Joanna C. Schwartz, Lexipol’s Fight Against Police
Reform, 97 IND. L.J. 1, 4–5 (2022).
277. The age of attainment of adult legal status has varied throughout history
and has often been linked to the capacities required of adults in a particular time
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the age at which people tend to develop the capacities
necessary for that job is more principled than the age of
majority, which applies to a range of rights and privileges
with differing demands on capacity. 278 Many areas of society,
including policing, currently operate using age cut-offs to
determine eligibility for jobs and other legal protections or
privileges. 279 Though any age threshold is vulnerable to
critique, a twenty-five-year-old hiring age represents a
reasonable compromise between an ideal age for psychosocial
skill-intensive work and the realities of modern policing and
hiring. Before twenty-five, emerging adults tend to lack the
capacities necessary to meet the demands of policing, and
minimum hiring ages should reflect that. 280 While there
remains uncertainty about the capacities of emerging adults
and place. See Vivian E. Hamilton, Adulthood in Law and Culture, 91 TUL. L.
REV. 55, 61–62 (2016). As Hamilton notes, the most common U.S. age of majority,
eighteen, followed from the decrease in the draft eligibility age from twenty-one
to eighteen during World War II to satisfy the need for additional soldiers. Id. at
64–65. The age of majority is also subject to a number of exceptions that mean it
is not the moment of attainment of complete adult legal status. See infra note 288
and accompanying text.
278. See Hamilton, supra note 277, at 94 (“It is possible to characterize agerelated capacity as a function of: (1) patterns of cognitive and socio-emotional
development; (2) the nature of the capacity being exercised (e.g., characteristics
of the task to be performed or the decision to be made); (3) the context in which
the capacity will be exercised; and (4) the broader social, cultural, and economic
milieu.”). But see Elizabeth Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29
HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 560 (2000) (“The use of a [categorical age of majority] to
designate the end of childhood ignores individual variations in developmental
maturity as well as varying maturity demands across the range of legal rights
and responsibilities. Nonetheless, it generally functions quite well.”).
279. See supra note 17 and accompanying text; see also, Hamilton, supra note
277, at 76–80 (describing age cut-offs for various rights and privileges that differ
from the age of majority based on societal understandings of adolescents’ and
emerging adults’ developmental capacities); Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Legal Age,
63 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 9–10), https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3949829; Ryan, supra note 26, at 1165
(recognizing that a single, bright line age at which all legal rights and
responsibilities are realized tracks neither current law nor the capacities of
emerging adults); Jonathan Todres, Maturity, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 1107, 1120–21
(2012) (acknowledging that the transition to legal adulthood or maturity does not
occur all at once at the age of majority).
280. See supra Part III.
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between twenty-five and thirty, such a dramatic increase
may not be feasible without a significant decrease in the size
of police forces, which at this time does not seem politically
viable. 281 As clarity about marginal developmental gains
between twenty-five and thirty become clearer, it may be
necessary to reevaluate twenty-five as an appropriate age
threshold.
No doubt, increasing the minimum hiring age for police
places a roadblock, however temporary, before people who
want to become officers. But when public safety and wellbeing are at stake, that delay is justified, especially in the
absence of better methods to evaluate the developmental
maturity of individual officers. Expressed risk preference
and expressed susceptibility to peer pressure do not tend to
predict emerging adults’ behavior. 282 Likewise, any attempt
to generalize group-level data to an individual suffers from
the group-to-individual problem. 283 Scientific studies use
data from groups of individuals to draw inferences that can
be generalized to the populations from which the individuals
come. 284 Any single individual, however, may be an outlier.
Therefore, scientists caution against using group data to
draw legal inferences about individual subjects. 285
Administrative costs are another barrier. Even if there
were a reliable way to make individualized determinations
about emerging adult officers’ development, the
administrative costs associated with individualized
determinations would further expand the demands on police
department bureaucracies and outweigh the benefits of any

281. For an example of the difficulty of passing this type of legislation, see
notes 288–94 and accompanying text.
282. Gardner & Steinberg, supra note 214, at 630.
283. Joshua W. Buckholtz & David L. Faigman, Promises, Promises for
Neuroscience and Law, 24 CURRENT BIOLOGY R861, R864 (2014).
284. Id.
285. Id. at R864–65.
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added
specificity
those
determinations
offer. 286
Individualized determinations also open the door to the
influence of explicit and implicit biases. 287 While recognizing
that threshold ages at best roughly approximate maturity,
they may be the best approximation available. 288
A bill proposed in the California legislature provides a
useful model of the reasoning for and consequences of
increasing the minimum police hiring age. As originally
introduced, Assembly Bill No. 89 of 2021, also known as the
Peace Officers Education and Age Conditions for
Employment Act or PEACE Act, would have increased the
minimum age of law enforcement hiring to twenty-five years
old with an exception for those with a bachelor’s or other
advanced degree from an accredited college or university. 289
286. See Boni-Saenz, supra note 279, at 21 (citing Victor Thuronyi, The Concept
of Income, 46 TAX L. REV. 45, 92 (1990) (“Some equitable rules simply are not
administrable in practice. Other rules, even if administrable, would impose
unduly burdensome compliance costs on tax administrator and taxpayers.”)); id.
at 26–33 (describing the administrability of chronological, biological, and
subjective conceptions of legal age).
287. See Todres, supra note 279, at 1120.
288. For more extensive discussions of the pitfalls of using bright-line age cutoffs for drawing conclusions about developmental status, see Ryan, supra note
26, at 1163, and Buss, supra note 267, at 37–41. Buss advocates for age
thresholds that consider “not only to what children, in the aggregate, can already
do, but also to the role we expect the law to play in enhancing their development.”
Id. at 54. This article aligns with Buss’s approach in that it considers not only
what emerging adult officers’ capacities are at the time of hiring, but also the
effects of the social and legal context of police departments in shaping who
emerging adult officers will become.
289. A.B. 89, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2021). The California bill as
first proposed would have increased hiring age while maintaining an exception
for those with a college or other advanced degree. While the bill does so citing
studies indicating better policing outcomes for police with university degrees
versus with only some college or a high school degree, the effects of education and
brain development should not be confused. While police with more education may
be better equipped in some circumstances, no level of education changes the
trajectory of emerging adult brain development. Education requirements are also
more likely than age requirements to disfavor minoritized groups who have
traditionally been excluded from policing. While perhaps necessary as a political
compromise or more viable in response to concerns about the available workforce,
a better law would not create exceptions based on education for those under
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In support of the Bill, legislators raised concerns about young
and less educated officers’ use of deadly force and cited
studies about policing outcomes and emerging adult brain
development. 290 The Bill also recognized that the legislature
had already used neurological and developmental research
to support changes to criminal sentencing laws. 291
Law enforcement agencies understandably may be
concerned about the effects of increasing the minimum
hiring age on their ability to recruit enough officers and meet
other recruiting goals, such as racial and gender diversity. 292
Though any increase in minimum hiring age will inevitably
decrease the pool of eligible applicants, one study found that
increasing the minimum hiring age of Indianapolis police
officers to twenty-five years old would have eliminated 27.9%
of successful applicants, with no disproportionate effect on
the proportions of women or candidates of color, unlike
increasing educational requirements. 293 The PEACE Act
suggested that the proposed twenty-five-year-old minimum
age requirement would have an even smaller effect. It
asserted that in California from 2014 to 2018, only 8.7% of
the police force was under twenty-five years old, and
twenty-five years old. The bill was later amended to reduce the increase in the
minimum hiring age from twenty-five to twenty-one. While the amended bill does
not implement this Article’s proposal, it does give insight into the potential for
this type of reform.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See generally Jeremy M. Wilson et al., Police Recruitment and Retention
for the New Millennium: The State of Knowledge, RAND CORP. (2010),
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG959.
pdf; Sid Smith, A Crisis Facing Law Enforcement: Recruiting in the 21st Century,
POLICE CHIEF MAG., https://www.policechiefmagazine.org/a-crisis-facing-lawenforcement-recruiting-in-the-21st-century/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2022); J.D.
Tuccille, U.S. Cops Are Facing a Recruitment Crisis. Will It Force Them to Change
Their Ways?, REASON (June 25, 2019, 9:52 AM), https://reason.com/2019/06/25/us-cops-are-facing-a-recruitment-crisis-will-it-force-them-to-change-their-ways/.
293. Decker & Huckabee, supra note 105, at 799 (Raising the age would have
eliminated 27.9% of successful applicants, but it would not have had a
disproportionate effect on women or minorities. Instead, it would have eliminated
18% (n=7) of the 39 Black applicants and 23.5% (n=8) of women who applied.).
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approximately 30% of those under twenty-five held a
bachelor’s degree. 294 The Bill concluded that its restrictions
on hiring “would not significantly affect the available
workforce.” 295
Increasing the hiring age may also have positive longterm effects on attrition, because psychological factors, such
as trauma and substance use, have a disproportionate effect
on emerging adult officers. 296 Raising the minimum hiring
age may also have desirable knock-on effects, such as
increasing the average education level of new recruits. Since
higher levels of education tend to decrease civilian
complaints and incidents of misconduct among officers, a
higher minimum age may result in an improvement of
qualifications along multiple indicators. To the extent there
is a concern that increasing the minimum hiring age will
shrink the pool of eligible officer candidates, legislatures
could also consider lifting or abolishing the maximum
qualifying age, which may keep out otherwise healthy and
able officers. 297
Legislative intervention in police hiring standards will
not come easily. Law enforcement controls a powerful
lobby. 298 After pushback from law enforcement, the PEACE
Act passed with a much less ambitious increase in the

294. A.B. 89, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2021).
295. Id. Despite this, law enforcement concerns are what led to the shift from
requiring a twenty-five to twenty-one-year-old minimum hiring age.
296. See supra Section III.C.
297. Alexander Boni-Saenz suggests in his article Legal Age it may be
appropriate to more “more heavily [scrutinize] those rules for older adults in
which chronological age is a particularly poor proxy.” Boni-Saenz, supra note 279,
at 7. Courts have criticized mandatory retirement ages for police for similar
reasons. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 327 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (describing mandatory retirement of police officers at fifty years old
as the “height of irrationality” when it is easy to administer fitness tests).
298. See, e.g., Luke Broadwater & Catie Edmondson, Police Lobby Steers
Congress Away from Major Reforms, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2020, at A23; Levine,
supra note 69, at 1208 (citing William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 534 (2001)).
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minimum hiring age for police to twenty-one years old. 299
Even with resistance from law enforcement agencies, the
psychosocial capacities of emerging adults make raising the
minimum hiring age an important reform. Currently, states
and localities play a relatively limited role in setting
minimum hiring ages, but they have the power to set a floor
for agencies in their jurisdiction. They should take the
opportunity to do so.
B. Reassign Emerging Adult Officers
Changes in departmental hiring policies will not be
immediate. In the meantime, it would be prudent to restrict
emerging adult officers to duties that are less likely to put
them in the position to use force or require a weapon. 300 This
would likely require changes to police assignments and may
require incentivizing older officers to take street-level
assignments or work less desirable shifts. 301 Taking
emerging adult officers off the streets could also facilitate the
allocation of a greater share of police to crime-solving,
investigatory functions, as is done in some European
countries, rather than relying on the U.S. “proactive
policing” model. 302 This type of function is also more aligned
with emerging adult officers’ developmental capacities.
Cognitive capacity, unlike psychosocial capacity, is fully
developed by age sixteen. 303 Therefore, investigative
299. Assemb. B. 89, 2021 Gen. Assemb. (Ca. 2021).
300. See, e.g., Paoline & Terrill, supra note 39, at 193 (arguing that officers’
duties might be adjusted given their finding that less experienced officers use
force at greater rates than more experienced officers). Illinois follows a model that
appoints 20-year-olds to active duty but does not give them to power of arrest or
permission to carry firearms until they reach 21 years of age. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/10-1-7(j) (West 2014).
301. Id.
302. See generally Jeff Asher & Ben Horwitz, How Do the Police Actually Spend
Their Time?, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/19
/upshot/unrest-police-time-violent-crime.html (describing that police spend very
little of their time solving crime).
303. Scott, Bonnie & Steinberg, supra note 28, at 648.
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functions requiring cold-cognition analysis are
appropriate assignments for emerging adult officers.

more

Some police agencies already allow younger emerging
adults to join their departments as non-police officers with
circumscribed duties. For example, the Memphis Police
Department (MPD) employs police service technicians who
can be as young as eighteen years old. 304 They are unarmed
and respond to minor car crashes and participate in crowd
control. 305 The MPD incentivizes these technicians to join by
fast-tracking them through the academy and offering them
college tuition support. 306 While car crash investigation may
involve cold-cognition skills appropriate to an emerging
adult officer, crowd control may be a different story, with
higher interpersonal tension and greater likelihood of
escalation, albeit, without a firearm.
Moving emerging adults into positions within
departments that require less psychosocial capacity has its
limits. Placing emerging adults in law enforcement agencies
before their appointment to the police force may still expose
them to occupational and legal socialization that would best
be avoided. Prospective recruits may also be less inclined to
join agencies where they will be relegated to less publicfacing work or not be allowed to carry a firearm, as they may
resent not getting to do “real police work.” 307 Reassigning
emerging adult police is best used as a bridge to other
solutions.

304. Daniel Connolly, Memphis Police Department Loosens College
Requirement for Recruits, COM. APPEAL (June 25, 2018, 7:15 PM), https://www
.commercialappeal.com/story/news/2018/06/25/memphis-police-departmentloosens-college-requirement-mpd-academy/731702002/. This practice also shows
that people within police agencies who are not yet sworn officer may still be
socialized into policing at a relatively young age. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. See generally Friedman, supra note 41 (exploring the concept of removing
non-police functions that police have more recently taken over from other
government offices or social services).
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C. Restructure Training to Scaffold Emerging Adult
Officers’ Development
Changes in police officer training generally have not
resulted in dramatic changes to the cultures of departments
or the ways that they police. In fact, training programs have
tended to bloat police department budgets and reinforce
misguided notions of police expertise. 308 Formal training also
tends to have less influence on recruits than informal
organizational socialization. 309 In the context of emerging
adult officer risk-taking, the results are likely to be even
bleaker. Studies of educational programs to prevent
adolescent risk-taking behavior demonstrate that these
programs improve knowledge but do not change behavior. 310
While similar studies with respect to emerging adults are not
available, emerging adults engage in similar, but more
frequent, risk-taking behavior than adolescents. 311
Therefore, training should not be a primary means of
reducing the harm of emerging adult officers. Nevertheless,
given emerging adult officers’ development within police
departments, there are interventions that could be made to
improve outcomes without pouring resources into an
intervention that is likely to fail.
Field training officers have been shown to have a strong
influence on their trainees. 312 Despite this, they are not
always carefully vetted or selected, and they may not have
the training in interpersonal skills necessary to reduce the
harms of policing. More careful selection of FTOs would
improve trainees’ socialization and help narrow the chasm
between classroom and field training. Police training
308. See Akbar, supra note 6, at 1808. To understand how training grows police
power, see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
309. See Stradling, Crowe & Tuohy, supra note 199, at 145; see also supra
Section III.A.
310. Steinberg, supra note 244, at 80.
311. Gardner & Steinberg, supra note 214, at 630.
312. See McGinley, Agnew-Pauley, Tompson & Belur, supra note 204, at 58.
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academies should also shift away from being stress and fearbased, as that unduly influences trainees’ perception of their
work and is likely to have an adverse influence on their
mental health. 313 Stress and fear-based training in turn
drives out police officers with more desirable characteristics
and those who are more interested in new approaches to
policing. Finally, insularity and the us-versus-them
mentality created by academy training is counterproductive
to developing thoughtful, service-oriented police officers. 314
Therefore, it may be useful to draw more expertise from
outside the police organization and give outside experts
Incremental
equal
stature
to
police
trainers. 315
improvements to training may ameliorate some harms of
development within police agencies, but it cannot stand
alone to protect communities from emerging adult officers.
D. Create Public Service Opportunities as an On-Ramp to
Police Service
Rather than creating early-entry programs within the
police department, aspiring police officers should be given
options to serve in the community that earn them hiring
preference and will diversify their life experiences and
viewpoints prior to joining the academy. First-responder
programs, which are replacing armed police in some
localities, may be one good option, though the high-stress
situations presented therein and the psychosocial skills
needed may not be optimally suited for emerging adults.
Other programs, like AmeriCorps, the Peace Corps, or the
proposed Civilian Climate Corps, which create bonds with
the community, impart important life lessons, and serve
similar communities to those disproportionately harmed by
313. See supra Section III.C.
314. See supra Section III.A.
315. Patrick Doreian & Norman Conti, Creating the Thin Blue Line: Social
Network Evolution Within a Police Academy, 50 SOC. NETWORKS 83, 93 (2017)
(recounting the open hostility of recruits to two academics, among the only nonpolice trainers in the academy, who taught an off-site training on racial bias).
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policing, may be better options. Gaining exposure to people
from different walks of life in settings in which emerging
adults are far less likely to be on high alert may improve
officers’ later interactions with similar groups. It may be a
challenge to recruit officers with a diversity of backgrounds
through public service programs. Service opportunities are
rarely well-paid, which may create barriers for aspiring
police from lower socio-economic statuses, communities of
color, or those with familial responsibilities. To allay some of
these concerns, government at the local, state, or federal
level could subsidize the salaries of those service programs,
offer educational incentives, or consider the years in public
service as relevant to promotions and salary increases once
individuals have joined a police agency. Some incentives
already exist, either at the departmental or state level, for
those who have completed military service. Recognizing a
broader range of service to one’s community and country
might also encourage better policing outcomes and more
diversity within the police ranks.
E. Strengthen Police Accountability
Scholars have argued that police must face greater
accountability when entrusted with such great authority. 316
Changes to civil and criminal liability for police have
typically been viewed as post-hoc redresses of harm or as a
way of finding justice for victims, 317 but for emerging adult
officers, officer discipline and accountability must also be
viewed as a scaffold for their development. If emerging adult
316. See generally Moran, supra note 49; Schwartz, supra note 8.
317. At the same time, others argue that justice cannot occur at that stage, and
rather police are facing accountability. This results in a difficult conversation
about what we mean by accountability. Danielle Sered argues that the criminal
legal system is not accountability-focused, and that accountability is a much more
difficult process. See generally DANIELLE SERED, UNTIL WE RECKON: VIOLENCE,
MASS INCARCERATION, AND A ROAD TO REPAIR (2019). Rachel Moran’s proposal for
increasing the use of mediation for civilian complaints against officers
operationalizes at least some of Sered’s critique in the context of police discipline.
See Moran, supra note 49, at 998–1000.
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officers perceive themselves as existing above or outside the
law, that will influence how they behave and exacerbate
their incapacities. 318 Their legal socialization is also likely to
influence their behavior over the long term. Scaffolding
emerging adult officer development through discipline
requires recognition of the social context of the harm they
have caused in addition to real consequences for their
wrongdoing.
Of course, police departments and those that hold them
accountable have feared that increasing discipline will cause
officers to refuse to do their jobs and that such oversight
amounts to second-guessing brave officers who risk their
lives for their community on a daily basis. 319 The reality of
police discipline, though, is that it is feeble, decried even by
some
law
enforcement
officials. 320
Accountability
mechanisms must be built up and calibrated to address
wrongdoing while recognizing the structural, rather than
individual, nature of the problem. 321 Critical Resistance
advocates ending paid administrative leave while police are
investigated, withholding the pensions of police fired for
violence, and not rehiring police terminated for excessive
force. The organization also opposes the creation of new
civilian oversight boards. 322 Abolitionists also reject criminal
prosecutions of police, which “exceptionalise th[e] situation
as the result of one bad cop.” 323 While the development of a
318. See supra Section III.D.
319. See generally Shaila Dewan, Deconstructing the ‘Ferguson Effect,’ N.Y.
TIMES (March 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/us/politics
/ferguson-effect.html (describing how police say they have withdrawn from
policework because of hostility from the public).
320. See Levin, supra note 70, at 1345; see also supra Section I.D.
321. See Akbar, supra note 6, at 1832.
322. CRITICAL RESISTANCE, supra note 95.
323. Akbar, supra note 6, at 1832 (alteration in original) (citing Rachel Herzing
& Isaac Ontiveros, Responding to Police Killing: Questions and Challenges for
Abolitionists, CRIM. JUST. MATTERS, Dec. 2010, at 38, 39). See generally SERED,
supra note 317; Kate Levine, Police Prosecutions and Punitive Instincts, 98 WASH.
U. L. REV. 997 (2021).
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robust police accountability system is beyond the scope of
this Article, any disciplinary reforms must attempt to ensure
accountability, rather than simply punishment, and
recognize emerging adult officers’ place within the agency
context.
F. Study Emerging Adult Officers’ Behavior
Further studies are necessary to inform evidence-based
harm reduction policies that reduce the likelihood of poor
policing due to developmental immaturity. Those studies will
principally be in two areas: emerging adult development and
criminology. As referenced in Part II, much more research
has focused on adolescent capacities than emerging adult
capacities. 324 Where researchers have focused on emerging
adult capacities, they have not always distinguished within
the subset of emerging adults or compared emerging adults’
capacities to those of older adults. 325 Further study is needed
to understand the behavioral effects of continued brain
maturation throughout a person’s twenties, especially in the
areas of risk-taking, impulsivity, emotional reasoning, and
self-regulation errors.
From a criminological standpoint, further studies should
examine the effects of police officer age on policing outcomes.
As Part I indicates, only a limited number of studies have
examined the relationship between age and outcomes such
as frequency of use of force, frequency of civilian complaints,
or frequency of arrest for citable offenses. Likewise, those
studies have not always controlled for other potentially
confounding factors such as level of education or experience,
nor have they accounted for age at hire rather than age at
the time of a particular incident.
More detailed studies across different agencies could
help police leaders determine which hiring criteria are most
324. See supra Part II.
325. Scott, Bonnie & Steinberg, supra note 28, at 650.
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effective at reducing undesirable outcomes. Moreover,
qualitative analysis of use of force reports or civilian
complaints could help determine whether there are specific
circumstances under which emerging adult police officers are
least effective. If so, police departments could use this
analysis to tailor work assignments to address those
deficiencies. The release of body-worn camera footage could
also be fruitful in facilitating qualitative studies comparing
escalation, patterns of arrest, or uses of force by emerging
adult police officers as compared to their older peers. 326 With
access to reports and body camera footage, researchers could
also study whether the social contagion effect of police
misconduct is more pronounced among emerging adult
officers. Likewise, longitudinal studies examining outcomes
over the course of officers’ careers for those who began their
policing careers at different ages may shed light on the longterm effects of hiring emerging adult police officers.
One of the greatest challenges to completing
criminological research about the behavior of emerging adult
officers is lack of access to the necessary reports, video, and
personnel records. To date, most studies of policing outcomes
based on age, either at the time of a particular event or at
hire, have only been possible with the cooperation of police
agencies. Therefore, data and reporting transparency is key
to targeting and testing hiring policies. Police agencies
should take seriously the responsibility to use
neurobiological and criminological studies to develop
evidence-based practices that eliminate or mitigate the
effects of developmental immaturity on policing outcomes.

326. See, e.g., Dale W. Willits & David A. Makin, Show Me What Happened:
Analyzing Use of Force Through Analysis of Body-Worn Camera Footage, 55 J.
RSCH. CRIME & DELINQ. 51, 52 (2018).
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CONCLUSION
Emerging adulthood has gained coherence as a period of
life and as a field of study, bolstering society’s intuitions
about the differences between younger and older adults, with
scientific explanations for how and why those differences
persist through the third decade of life. At the same time, the
legal field has widely accepted the science of psychological
and neurobiological development as a meaningful basis for
reform of the criminal legal system and beyond. As the
criminal legal system responds to calls for reform, policing
faces similar demands as part of the same carceral state. In
some ways, the demands on policing are even more radical,
with calls for police defunding sounding louder than ever.
While increasing the minimum hiring age for police is a far
cry from abolition, its goals are consonant with organizers’
goals to shift power away from police agencies, decrease the
law enforcement footprint, and question the underlying
socialization of policing without increasing budgets. Though
any reform risks legitimating a system that may well be
beyond repair, intermediate steps that mitigate harm to the
lives of those in communities subordinated by instant models
of policing must not be rejected out of hand.
Understanding the neurobiological and psychological
research on emerging adulthood, police agencies and
lawmakers should increase police minimum hiring ages to
better reflect how emerging adulthood shapes the capacities
of emerging adult officers. Where police agencies are
unwilling to act, lawmakers should act at the local or state
level to override internal agency policies, and the federal
government should incentivize adoption of minimum hiring
age policies. In addition, agencies should take steps to
minimize the harms caused by already-hired emerging adult
officers by reconsidering their duties, carefully monitoring
their practices, and shielding them from known bad actors
within the agencies early in their careers. Improving the
quality of police hires by incorporating evidence about
developmental maturity has the potential to facilitate shifts

354

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

in policing culture and mitigate the harm that officers
without sufficient psychosocial maturity inflict on the
communities they police.
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APPENDIX A 327

Law
Enforcement
Agency
New York City
Police (NY) 328
Chicago
Police (IL) 330
Los Angeles
Police (CA) 331
Philadelphia
Police (PA) 332
Houston
Police (TX) 333

State Law
Minimum
Hiring Age

Local Law
Minimum
Hiring Age

Agency
Minimum
Hiring Age

Agency
Maximum
Hiring Age

20

None

21 329

35

20

None

21

40

21

None

21

None

18

None

22

None

18, 21 334

None

21 335

44

327. State and local laws contained here only address law enforcement-specific
requirements; general civil service laws that require a minimum hiring age are
not reported. Where there are multiple hiring ages for localities with different
sizes, those are reported. Policies that set age requirements with reference to a
date other than age on date of first service are noted in the footnotes. Agencies
are listed from largest to smallest.
328. May take the entrance exam until thirty-fifth birthday. Police Officers
Hiring Process, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/careers
/police-officers/po-hiring.page (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
329. Id. May take Police Officer’s Entrance Exam at seventeen and a half.
330. Chicago Police Officer Recruitment, CHI. POLICE DEP’T, https://home
.chicagopolice.org/bethechange/chicago-police-officer-recruitment/ (last visited
Jan. 22, 2022).
331. May apply at twenty but must be twenty-one by academy graduation.
LAPD Qualifications, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, https://www.joinlapd.com/qualifications
(last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
332. Qualifications
and
Requirements,
PHILA.
POLICE
DEP’T,
https://www.joinphillypd.com/qualifications-and-requirements (last visited Jan.
22, 2022).
333. Requirements, HOUS. POLICE DEP’T,
/requirements.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).

https://www.hpdcareer.com

334. Texas requires police to be at least eighteen unless they police a city larger
than 1.5 million people, in which case they must be at least twenty-one. See TEX.
LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 143.023, 143.105 (West 2021).
335. May apply at twenty and a half but must be twenty-one by academy
graduation. Requirements, HOUS. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 333.

356
Law
Enforcement
Agency
Washington
Metropolitan
Police (DC) 336
Dallas Police
(TX) 337
Phoenix
Police (AZ) 340
Baltimore
Police (MD) 342
Miami-Dade
Police (FL) 344
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State Law
Minimum
Hiring Age

Local Law
Minimum
Hiring Age

Agency
Minimum
Hiring Age

Agency
Maximum
Hiring Age

None

21

21

None

18, 21 338

None

19.5, 21 339

44

21

None

21 341

None

21

None

21 343

None

19

None

21 345

None

336. Becoming a Police Officer, Qualifications, METRO. POLICE DEP’T,
https://joinmpd.dc.gov/node/501 (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
337. Recruiting, Qualifications, DALL. POLICE DEP’T, https://dallaspolice
.net/joindpd/Pages/Qualifications.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
338. See discussion supra note 334.
339. Recruiting, Qualifications, DALL. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 337.
Applicants between nineteen and twenty-one must have a minimum of sixty
semester college hours with a 2.0 GPA from an accredited college or university.
Applicants that are twenty-one or older must have a minimum of 45 semester
college hours with a 2.0 GPA from an accredited college or university. Id.
340. Police Officer Recruit Application Minimum Requirements, CITY OF PHX.,
https://www.phoenix.gov/police/joinphxpd/application-requirements (last visited
Jan. 22, 2022).
341. Must be twenty and a half at application and twenty-one by academy
completion. Id.
342. Sworn Careers, BALT. POLICE DEP’T, https://www.baltimorepolice.org
/careers/sworn-careers (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
343. May start the academy at twenty and nine months but must be twentyone by graduation. Id.
344. Careers: Police Officer, MIA.-DADE CNTY., https://www.miamidade.gov
/global/police/careers-police-officer.page (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
345. Must be twenty to apply and be twenty-one by time of hire. Id.
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Enforcement
Agency

State Law
Minimum
Hiring Age

Las Vegas
Metropolitan
Police (NV) 346

21

Detroit Police
(MI) 348

18 349

Memphis
Police (TN) 350
Suffolk
County (NY)
Police 352
Milwaukee
Police (WI) 354

357

DEVELOPING POLICE
Local Law
Minimum
Hiring Age

City ordinance
requires
compliance
with state
administrative
code.
City ordinance
requires
compliance
with the
Michigan
Commission on
Law
Enforcement
Standards Act.

Agency
Minimum
Hiring Age

Agency
Maximum
Hiring Age

21 347

None

18

None

18

None

21 351

None

20

None

19 353

34

18

None

21 355

None

346. Frequently Asked Questions, LAS VEGAS METRO. POLICE DEP’T,
https://www.lvmpd.com/en-us/ProtectTheCity/Pages/FAQs.aspx (last visited
Jan. 22, 2022).
347. Must reach twenty-one by the date of the first exam. Id.
348. Detroit Police Department Careers, CITY OF DETROIT, https://detroitmi.gov
/departments/police-department/detroit-police-department-careers (last visited
Jan. 22, 2022).
349. Age of majority, as defined by another statute. Id.
350. Police Recruit, MEMPHIS POLICE DEP’T,
paths/police-recruit/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).

http://joinmpd.com/career-

351. Must attain twenty-one by the end of basic training. Id.
352. Minimum Requirements, SUFFOLK CNTY. POLICE DEP’T, https://joinscpd
.com/minimum-requirements.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
353. At time of written exam. Id.
354. Employment Opportunities, Police Officer, CITY OF MILWAUKEE,
https://www.jobapscloud.com/MIL/sup/bulpreview.asp?R1=1902&R2=2342&R3=
001 (last visited Jan. 22, 2022) (Recruitment #1902-2342-001).
355. May be twenty at time of application but must be twenty-one at time of
appointment. Id.

358
Law
Enforcement
Agency
San Antonio
Police (TX) 356
Nassau
County Police
(NY) 359
San Francisco
Police (CA) 361
Boston Police
(MA) 363
Honolulu
Police (HI) 366
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State Law
Minimum
Hiring Age

Local Law
Minimum
Hiring Age

Agency
Minimum
Hiring Age

Agency
Maximum
Hiring Age

18, 21 357

None

20.5 358

45

20

None

21 360

35

21

None

21 362

None

21 364

None

21 365

39

None
located

None

21 367

None

356. Rule VII Minimum Qualifications, Police Officers, SAN ANTONIO POLICE
CAREERS (Jan. 30, 2017), https://sapdcareers.com/documents/Civil_Service_
Rules_062617.pdf.
357. See discussion supra note 334.
358. At time of application; applicants must be 20.5 by the date of exam. Rule
VII, Police Officers, SAN ANTONIO POLICE CAREERS, supra note 356.
359. Recruitment,
NASSAU
CNTY.
/Recruitment (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).

POLICE,

https://www.pdcn.org/148

360. May take the written exam at seventeen but may not be appointed until
they reach twenty-one. E-mail from Community Affairs for Nassau County Police
Recruitment to Author (Dec. 8, 2021, 16:36 EST) (on file with author).
361. General Information and Qualifications, S.F. POLICE DEP’T,
http://www.sanfranciscopolice.org/your-sfpd/careers/sworn-job-openings/generalinformation-and-qualifications (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
362. May take the exam at twenty but must be twenty-one at appointment. Id.
363. How to Become a Police Officer, CITY OF BOS., https://www.boston.gov
/departments/police/how-become-police-officer (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
364. May take the exam at nineteen but may not be appointed until twentyone. Id.
365. May take the exam at nineteen but may not be hired until twenty-one. Id.
366. Minimum Qualifications: Metropolitan Police Recruit, HONOLULU POLICE
DEP’T,
https://www.joinhonolulupd.org/minimum-qualifications2.html
(last
visited Jan. 22, 2022).
367. May apply at twenty but must be twenty-one by academy graduation. Id.
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Law
Enforcement
Agency
Atlanta Police
(GA) 368
Columbus
Police (OH) 370
Baltimore
County Police
(MD) 372
San Diego
Police (CA) 374
CharlotteMecklenburg
Police (NC) 376
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State Law
Minimum
Hiring Age

Local Law
Minimum
Hiring Age

Agency
Minimum
Hiring Age

Agency
Maximum
Hiring Age

18

None

21 369

None

21

None

20 371

None

21 373

Permits
trainee “police
cadets”
between 18
and 21, noncadets must be
21

21

None

21

None

21 375

None

20

None

20 377

None

368. Police Officer Recruit (Job Number: 200434), ATLANTA, GA,
https://atlantaga.taleo.net/careersection/coa_sworn_external_career_section/job
detail.ftl?job=200434&lang=en&sns_id=mailto#.Xv32Xn_0sSs.mailto
(last
visited Jan. 22, 2022).
369. May apply at twenty and a half but must be twenty-one by academy
graduation. Id.
370. Becoming an Officer, CITY OF COLUMBUS, https://www.columbus.gov
/police-officer/minimum-qualifications/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
371. At time of application. Id.
372. Learn About the Job, BALT. CNTY. GOV’T, https://www.baltimorecountymd
.gov/departments/police/careers/about.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
373. May be twenty at time of academy but must be twenty-one by academy
graduation. Id.
374. Police Recruit (Entry Level), CITY OF SAN DIEGO, https://www.sandiego.gov
/join-san-diego-police-department/apply (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
375. May take written test at twenty but must be twenty-one by academy
graduation. Id.
376. Minimum Standards to Become an Officer, CITY OF CHARLOTTE,
https://charlottenc.gov/CMPD/Organization/recruitment/Pages/MinimumStandards.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
377. At time of application. Id.

360
Law
Enforcement
Agency
Austin Police
(TX) 378
Prince
George’s
County Police
(MD) 381
Jacksonville
Sheriff’s
Office (FL) 384
Indianapolis
Metropolitan
Police (IN) 385
Fort Worth
Police (TX) 387
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State Law
Minimum
Hiring Age

Local Law
Minimum
Hiring Age

Agency
Minimum
Hiring Age

Agency
Maximum
Hiring Age

18, 21 379

None

20.5 380

45

21 382

None

21 383

None

19

None

21

None

21 386

None

21

40

18, 21 388

None

20 389

45

378. Hiring Process, AUSTIN POLICE DEP’T RECRUITING, https://www.apd
recruiting.org/hiring-process (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
379. See discussion supra note 334.
380. At time of application. See Hiring Process, AUSTIN POLICE DEP’T
RECRUITING, supra note 378.
381. George’s Cnty. Gov’t, Police Officer (50-PO1-2201), GOV’T JOBS,
https://www.governmentjobs.com/careers/pgc/jobs/3120803/police-officer-50-po12201?keywords=police&pagetype=jobOpportunitiesJobs (last visited Jan. 22,
2022).
382. May be twenty at time of academy but must be twenty-one by graduation.
Id.
383. May apply at twenty and a half but must be twenty-one at the time of
academy graduation. Id.
384. Florida Certified and Non-Certified Positions, JACKSONVILLE SHERIFF’S
OFF., https://www.jaxsheriff.org/Careers/Police-Officer.aspx (last visited Jan. 22,
2022).
385. Indianapolis Metro. Police Dep’t, What it Takes to Join the IMPD,
INDY.GOV, https://www.indy.gov/activity/what-it-takes-to-join-the-impd (last
visited Jan. 22, 2022).
386. Applies only to state police. No statute setting a minimum qualifying age
for city police. Id.
387. Police Officer Trainee Information, FORT WORTH, https://www.fortworth
texas.gov/departments/hr/careers/policerecruitment (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
388. See discussion supra note 334.
389. On date of assigned entry-level test. See Police Officer Trainee

2022]
Law
Enforcement
Agency
Cleveland
Police (OH) 390
Denver Police
(CO) 391
Kansas City
Police (MO) 392
Fairfax
County Police
(VA) 393
Metropolitan
Nashville
Police (TN) 395
St. Louis
Metropolitan
Police (MO) 396
Seattle Police
(WA) 397
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State Law
Minimum
Hiring Age

Local Law
Minimum
Hiring Age

Agency
Minimum
Hiring Age

Agency
Maximum
Hiring Age

21

None

21

39

None

None

21

None

21

None

21

None

18

None

20.5 394

None

18

None

21

None

21

None

21

None

None

None

20.5 398

None

Information, FORT WORTH, supra note 387.
390. Public Safety Careers, Police, CITY OF CLEVELAND, https://www.cleveland
ohio.gov/PublicSafetyCareers (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
391. City of Denver, Rule 3: Qualifications and Original Appointment,
DENVER.GOV (Dec. 19, 2014), https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/e9cf3f_78cadd3ec1cd
4a33a4a27041b7a38c71.pdf.
392. Job Description: Police Officer, KANSAS CITY MO. POLICE DEP’T (May 2018),
http://mediaweb.kcpd.org/informant/806PoliceOfficer.5.2018.pdf.
393. Police Officer 1, FAIRFAX CNTY., VA., https://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/police
/commontopics/joinourteam/policeofficer1 (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
394. At time of application. Id.
395. Police Officer Employment Standards, NASHVILLE.GOV, https://www.
nashville.gov/departments/police/get-involved/become-police-officer/employment
-standards (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
396. Am I Eligible?, ST. LOUIS METRO. POLICE DEP’T, https://www.slmpdrecruit
.org/amieligible (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
397. Seattle Police Department, Qualifications, SEATTLE, https://www.seattle
.gov/police/police-jobs/how-to-apply/qualifications#age (last visited Jan. 22,
2022).
398. At time of written exam. Id.

362
Law
Enforcement
Agency
New Orleans
Police (LA) 399
Louisville
Police (KY) 401
Montgomery
County Police
(MD) 403
El Paso Police
(TX) 406
Miami Police
(FL) 409
San Jose
Police (CA) 411
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State Law
Minimum
Hiring Age
None
located

Local Law
Minimum
Hiring Age

Agency
Minimum
Hiring Age

Agency
Maximum
Hiring Age

None

20 400

None

21

None

21 402

None

21 404

None

21 405

None

18, 21 407

None

21 408

None

19

None

19 410

None

21

None

20.5 412

70

399. Hiring Process, JOIN NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEP’T, https://joinnopd.org
/hiring-process/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
400. At time of application. Id.
401. Become an Officer, LOUISVILLE METRO. POLICE DEP’T, https://louisvillepolice.org/256/Become-an-Officer (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
402. At time of application. Id.
403. Police Officer – Requirements and Benefits, MONTGOMERY CNTY. DEP’T OF
POLICE, https://www.montgomerycountymd.gov/pol/jobs/pol-officer-benefits.html
(last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
404. May attend academy at twenty but must be twenty-one by graduation. Id.
405. By academy graduation. Id.
406. Police Trainee, CITY OF EL PASO, https://agency.governmentjobs.com
/elpaso/job_bulletin.cfm?jobID=3188719&sharedWindow=0 (last visited Jan. 22,
2022).
407. See discussion supra note 334.
408. By academy graduation. See Police Trainee, CITY OF EL PASO, supra note
406.
409. Become a Miami Police Officer, MIA., https://www.miamigov.com/CareersJobs/City-Jobs/Become-a-Miami-Police-Officer (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
410. At application. Id.
411. Police Recruit, SAN JOSE POLICE RECRUITMENT, https://www.sjpdyou.com
/for-applicants/applicant-positions/police-recruit (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
412. At application. Id.

2022]
Law
Enforcement
Agency
Newark Police
(NJ) 413
Cincinnati
Police (OH) 415
Albuquerque
Police (NM) 417
DeKalb
County Police
(GA) 420
Tampa Police
(FL) 422
Portland
Police (OR) 424
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State Law
Minimum
Hiring Age

Local Law
Minimum
Hiring Age

Agency
Minimum
Hiring Age

Agency
Maximum
Hiring Age

21

None

18 414

35

21

None

21 416

None

18 418

None

21 419

None

18

None

20 421

None

19

None

21 423

None

21

None

20.5 425

None

413. The City of Newark Is Recruiting for Police Officers, NEWARK BD. OF EDUC.
(July 8, 2019), https://www.nps.k12.nj.us/community/the-city-of-newark-isrecruiting-for-police-officers/.
414. At time of application. Id.
415. Police, Recruiting, CITY OF CINCINNATI, https://www.cincinnati-oh.gov
/police/recruiting/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
416. At appointment. Id.
417. Police Officer, ALBUQUERQUE POLICE, https://www.apdonline.com/policeofficer/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
418. Set at age of majority, which is 18. Id.
419. By academy graduation. Id.
420. Background and Recruiting, DEKALB CNTY., GA., https://www.dekalb
countyga.gov/police-services/background-and-recruiting (last visited Jan. 22,
2022).
421. At time of application. Id.
422. Police Officer, CITY OF TAMPA, https://www.jobapscloud.com/Tampa/sup
/bulpreview.asp?R1=210108&R2=007451&R3=001 (last visited Jan. 22, 2022)
(Recruitment #210108-007451-001).
423. At time of application. Id.
424. Entry: Minimum Requirements and Disqualifiers, JOIN PORTLAND POLICE
DEP’T, https://www.joinportlandpolice.com/entry-minimum-requirements (last
visited Jan. 22, 2022).
425. At time of application. Id.
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Law
Enforcement
Agency

State Law
Minimum
Hiring Age

Tucson Police
(AZ) 426

21 427

Local Law
Minimum
Hiring Age

“Reserve
police officers”
must be 21,
no ordinance
pertaining to
other officers.
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Agency
Minimum
Hiring Age

Agency
Maximum
Hiring Age

21 428

None

426. Qualifications, TUCSON POLICE RECRUITING, https://tpdrecruiting.tucson
az.gov/apply/qualifications (last visited Jan. 22, 2022).
427. At time of academy attendance or appointment. Id.
428. By academy completion. Id.
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APPENDIX B

State
Alabama

Alaska

Arizona
Arkansas
California

Colorado

Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana

Iowa

Statute(s)
ALA. CODE § 36-21-46(a)(1)
(2021)
ALASKA STAT. ANN.
§ 18.65.240 (West 2018);
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit.
13, § 85.010(a)(2) (2022)
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § 13-4105(A)(2) (2022)
132-00-1 ARK. CODE R.
§ 1002(3)(b) (LexisNexis
2021)
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 1031,
1031.4 (West 2022)
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 24-31-305 (West 2021);
4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 9011 (LexisNexis 2021)
CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 7294e-16(b) (2022)
1-801-3.0 DEL. ADMIN.
CODE § 3.3 (2022)
D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-107.01
(West 2016)
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.13(1)
(West 2021)
GA. CODE ANN. § 35-8-8(1)
(West 2018)

Minimum
Hiring Age

Maximum
Hiring Age

19

None

21

None

21

None

21

None

21

None

None

None

21

None

18 for seasonal
officer; 21 for
Full-Time

None

None

None

19

None

18

None

21

None

20, subject to
other
requirements

35, subject to
exceptions

21

40

18

None

Unable to Locate
IDAHO ADMIN. CODE
r. 11.11.01.054.01 (2021)
65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/10-1-7(h), (i), (j) (West
2014)
240 IND. ADMIN. CODE 1-43(2) (West 2020)
IOWA CODE ANN. § 80.15(1)
(West 2020);
IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 5012.1(80B)(2) (2021)

366
State
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Statute(s)
KAN. STAT. ANN. 745605(b)(8) (West 2018)
KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 15.382(2) (West 2021)

[Vol. 70

Minimum
Hiring Age

Maximum
Hiring Age

21

None

21

None

21 (unless
associate’s
degree or 60
college credit
hours)

None

21

None

Unable to Locate

Maine

16-227-3 ME. CODE R.
§ 2(B) (LexisNexis 2022)

Maryland

MD. CODE REGS.
12.04.01.04(A) (2021)

Massachusetts

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
22C, § 10 (West 2022);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
31, § 58, 58A (West 2022)

21

Michigan

MICH. ADMIN. CODE
r. 28.14203(b) (2022)

32 for municipal
police, subject to
exceptions,
35 for state
police

18

None

Minnesota

MINN. R. 6700.0700 (2022)

None

None

21

None

21

None

18

None

21

None

21

None

None

None

21

35

18 (“age of
majority”)

None

20

35, subject to
exceptions

31-301 MISS. CODE R.
§ 1.1.12 (LexisNexis 2022)
MO. CODE REGS. ANN.
Missouri
tit. 11, § 75-13.020(1)(A)
(2022)
MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-32Montana
303(2)(b) (West 2019)
79 NEB. ADMIN. CODE § 8Nebraska
005.01B (2021)
NEV. ADMIN. CODE
Nevada
§ 289.110(1)(c) (2021)
N.H. ADMIN. CODE R. Pol
New Hampshire
301 (2022)
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 53:1-9
New Jersey
(West 2021)
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-7New Mexico
6(A)(1) (West 2021)
N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW
New York
§ 58(1)(a), (1)(a)(i)-(iii)
(McKinney 2021)
Mississippi

2022]
State

North Carolina

Statute(s)

N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17C-10(c) (West 2022)

N.D. ADMIN. CODE 109-0201-03 (2022)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
Ohio
§ 124.41 (West 2021)
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70,
Oklahoma
§ 3311(E)(1)(h) (West 2021)
OR. ADMIN. R. 259-008Oregon
0010(2) (2021)
37 PA. CODE § 203.11(a)(1)
Pennsylvania
(2022)
270-30 R.I. CODE R. § 2.1
Rhode Island
(LexisNexis 2022)
S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-23South Carolina
60(B)(8) (2022)
S.D. ADMIN. R.
South Dakota
2:01:02:01(2) (2021)
TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-8Tennessee
106(1) (West 2021)
North Dakota

Texas

Utah
Vermont
Virginia
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Minimum
Hiring Age
Set by the North
Carolina
Criminal Justice
Education and
Training
Standards
Commission 429

Maximum
Hiring Age

None

None

21

35

21

None

21

None

18

None

None

None

None

None

21

None

18

None

18; 21 with
TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. conditions if
§§ 143.023(a), (c), 143.105 city’s population
(West 2021)
is 1.5 million or
greater
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-621
203(1)(b) (West 2021)
6-1 VT. ADMIN. CODE § 1:16
18
(West 2021)
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.218
1705(A)(vi) (West 2021)

None

45

None
None
None

429. The Commission has currently set the minimum hiring age at 20 years
old. FAQs, N.C. JUST. ACAD., https://ncdoj.gov/ncja/faqs/ (last visited Jan. 22,
2022).

368
State
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Statute(s)

Minimum
Hiring Age

WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 13907-010, 139-07-020, 139None
07-030 (2021)
W. VA. CODE R. §§ 81-2-2
21 (applies only
(2021)
to state police)
WIS. ADMIN. CODE LES § 218
01(1)(b) (2021)
15-9-2 WYO. ADMIN. CODE
18
§ 1(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2022)
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Maximum
Hiring Age
None
None
None
None

